

Wyjaśnienia tyczące się poszczególnych punktów projektowanej umowy.

First point.

For the purposes of our own organization:

- 1) £ 10.000 payable now
- 2) Sum of about the same amount payable after the New Year 1905
- 3) Guarantee of right to demand and receive after that date of sums of considerably higher amount.

Point II.

We cannot foresee at present the exact time when we shall require larger quantities of arms. In any case all arms supplied must be brought into the country in small quantities and therefore any accumulation of corresponding number of guns, etc. is to begin at a time considerably remote from the moment of actual beginning of an outbreak. Considering this, as well as our present need of small arms for the organisation of manifestation which could give more effective opposition to the attacks of the police - we require already at present 3,000 pieces of rifles. And we reserve for ourselves for the future time the privilege to obtain 60,000 in small parties (1,000 - 2,000) & the corresponding quantity of ammunition.

(Explanation: 1) why we prefer not to buy these things by own agents. 2) where it is to be delivered. 3) prefer Russian pattern (if impossible - Austrian).

Point III-a

Historical significance of 1. (Legion). It is by them always asserted again and again our claim to independence. L. in Napoleonic wars, in the Crimean war 1854, in the Russo-Turkish war 1878.

Thought of an armed outbreak^e was and is continually alive among Poles, and in all places giving to its inhabitants comparative freedom, numerous Polish societies are in existence having the military training of their members as a direct object. In such circumstances Polish l. will be looked upon by a number of our people as a nucleus of future army, and to whole our nation it will be an embodiment of animosity towards the Russian rule. On the other hand the appearance of the P.L. on the battlefields will revolutionise the spirit of indifferent elements of the nation to a largest extent than any other measure.

Passing to direct influence of P.L. on the operations of war, it is necessary to bear in mind that soldiers of Polish nationality consisted more than 30 per cent of total army stationed in Manchuria at the time of the outbreak of hostilities and that the number of them in the corps of Russian army on the way to the seat of war is about 12 per cent. According to our informations there were two months since (on the half of May) 40-45 thousands of soldiers of Polish origin in Manchuria and Baikal region. A soldier of Polish origin, if he has not a certain degree of his national consciousness, than at any rate he has not such a fidelity to the Tsar and attachment to the standard of his batallion as a Russian soldier has. The appeal to soldiers of Polish origin to desert the Russian army will undoubtedly find a wide circle of followers and add positively to the disorganisation of this army.

It is possible to call on P. (Poles) to desert by means of distribution of proclamations to this effect, etc. But circumstances would not permit wide and effective distribution of such proclamations - although at any rate they are necessary and will be partially successful, - whereas the news about P.L. fighting on the Japanese side will spread among Polish elements of Russian army irrespectively of all efforts of R. authorities to the contrary and will provide every Pole with the stronger argument in favor of desertion than that any proclamation can give.

All financial expenses will be covered by J.g.

Part of soldiers of P.L. will be recruited in Europe and in U.S. America by our agents and send to their place of destination at the expense of J.g.

Other part will be picked up from among deserters of Russian army (according to the taste agreed afterwards).

Officers will be supplied by our organisation.

The supreme command of the L. will belong to an officer nominated by our organisation.

The commanding officer will be dependend from a ~~xxxxx~~ board consisting of a representative of J.g. and a representative of our party. The authority over the L. will belong to the said board.

In a case of a revolutionary outbrak in Poland, L. will be send to Europe by means afforded by J.g.

Shall the hostilities between R. & J. terminate previously to any outbreak in Poland, the L. will be dissolved. Its soldiers willing to return home will given passage to U.S.A. or England; soldiers wishing to settle in Manchuria, Korea or Japan will have a right to do so and will receive certain facilities.

Disabled soldiers will receive reasonable pensions; the same pensions will be granted to the families, if any, of the soldiers who perish in the campaign.

The formation of P.L. and the services rendered by it against Russia could undoubtedly be looked upon by some powers as a breach of customs indicated by the international law, had not P.L. had a precedent. As such a precedent took place three times within the scope of ~~nineteenth~~ century any accusation of Japan's devising new means towards weakening her adversary would be out of place.

III. Zakończenie.

There may be two ways of looking at the future relations between Japanese government and our party (determined by the views taken by the J.g. as to ~~this~~ their policy towards R.): 1) an arrangement concluded only for the space of time, coinciding more or less with the duration of the war.

2) A lasting arr. concluded for constant & permanent undermining of Russia.

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Elsewhere we give reasons why the second form of arrangement would be preferable to both contracting parties.

The interpretation of some particular points of this agreement will vary accordingly to view J.g. is inclined to take on the essential character of it.