

in some cases centuries of history behind them, in addition to such journals as the *Neue Badische Landeszeitung*, the *Königsberger Hartungsche Zeitung*, and some of the greatest newspapers in Hamburg have disappeared, while others, such as the *Berliner Tageblatt* and the *Kölnische Zeitung*, lead a precarious existence, preserving little of their past glory in their present form. Nor are the newspaper fatalities in Germany by any means confined to the now despised democratic and liberal organs. Even those daily papers that were considered national and nationalistic both under the Kaiser and under the Republic and that expressed completely anti-liberal opinions are vanishing. The pan-German organ, *Deutsche Zeitung*, which confined itself chiefly to expressing the point of view of the landowners east of the Elbe, is approaching its end. But more interesting still is the fact that the organ of the German Labor Front, the *Deutsche*, the paper that Stegerwald founded and that has now fallen under the influence of Dr. Ley, has encountered a crisis.

Room was made for the *Deutsche* in the former Rudolf Mosse-Haus in the Jerusalemstrasse, on the front of which no longer stands the name 'Rudolf Mosse' but the *Deutsche*. The *Berliner Tageblatt*, which was barely tolerated, had to move its offices modestly to the rear of the building. As the crisis on the *Deutsche* indicates, even the hundred-per-cent press organs of the ruling elements cannot maintain themselves although every resource of propaganda is used to keep them going.

Like the *Deutsche*, the *Angriff*, the organ of Propaganda Minister Goebbels, is also vegetating. In order to promote its growth, the chief publishing house of the National-Socialist Party, the Eher Verlag, took it over, but the only publication now in a sound financial condition is the official Party organ, the *Völkische Beobachter*, in behalf of which the entire Party apparatus works. It has a total edition of 336,000, of which 245,000 copies are distributed in north Germany, including Berlin, and 91,000 in south Germany, including Munich.

These figures, of course, signify nothing when compared with the editions that German newspapers used to print. Some of these have disappeared entirely, while others have sunk to half or less than half their former circulation. The leveling process of National Socialism has killed and antagonized the German reading public, millions of whom now refuse to read a paper that provides nothing but slavishly repeated phrases. The pressure that has been exerted on all intellectual manifestations in Germany has even served to discredit the newspapers, magazines, and books that bear the imprint of any German publishing house. Finally, the Government itself has suffered from this very evident manifestation and has been robbed of the most effective medium of spreading propaganda in behalf of its ideas and its opinions. The nation that used to be the most intellectually alert in Europe, that was regarded abroad in Goethe's time as the land of poets and thinkers has to-day sunk into a state of dull, indifferent, apathetic hopelessness.

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Pilsudski in JAPAN

By RUDOLF HERRNSTADT

Translated from the *Berliner Tageblatt*
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BEFORE Poland came into existence, fighters for Polish independence distinguished themselves by their willingness to join forces with anybody who opposed the nations that had partitioned their country. As a result of this method of selecting allies, numerous misunderstandings arose, but so did the Polish nation. Pilsudski's domestic opponents used to reproach him with having made temporary alliances of which he took advantage on the theory that his allies had endorsed the Polish revolutionaries. Both parties in these alliances were mistaken and would revert to defending their real interests whenever they had time to do so.

Pilsudski and his legionaries always fought for Poland even when they wanted to give the outer appearance that their activities had some larger aim in view. Historically, the most important episode of this kind oc-

This little-known chapter in Pilsudski's career when he offered to help Japan against Russia throws light on the present alleged plans for a Polish-Japanese assault on the Soviet Union.

curred when the Polish Legion fraternized with the Central Powers at the beginning of the World War and ended by later ranging itself against the Central Powers. Another episode on a smaller scale occurred in 1904 when Pilsudski let it appear that he was subordinating himself to the aims of Japan, though in reality he was turning Japan's aims to the advantage of Poland. It was not his fault that his plan fell through.

The Polish Socialist Party watched the growing tension between Russia and Japan with the greatest interest and hope. This curious Socialist Party belonged to the Second International, and still does, although it included all the national-revolutionary young intellectuals of the country in addition to some of the proletariat. Pilsudski, who was then one of the leaders of the Polish Socialist Party, never attached much importance to the fact that he

knew little about Marx but had devoted himself to an intensive study of military science. The result was that, when the Russo-Japanese War offered Poland a chance to intervene against Russia, he and the Polish Socialist Party tried to take advantage of the opening.

The first effort of the Polish Socialist Party to reach an understanding with the Japanese Empire came from the leaders of that Party who were living abroad. They failed to make connections in Vienna and later failed in Paris. But Marquis Hayashi, the Japanese ambassador in London, finally developed a true understanding of the significance of the Polish question. Hayashi and his military attaché, Major Utsonomi, entered into negotiations with Dr. Jodko, the Polish Socialist leader.

On July 8, 1904, Pilsudski arrived in Tokyo accompanied by Tytus Filipowicz, who later became Polish ambassador to Washington. Major Inagaki, former Japanese military representative in London, received them and conducted them at their request and for reasons inherent in the affair to a hotel in the Japanese quarter. On July 12, Inagaki brought his guests to the Japanese general staff where General Muratu heard their basic demands. In the subsequent negotiations Pilsudski offered three forms of assistance—organized diversion of effort, organized revolutionary uprising, and an organized information service. In return he asked from the Japanese guns, munitions, the establishment of a Polish legion, and the raising of the Polish question on an international scale during the peace negotiations.

The services that the Poles offered

aroused more enthusiasm among the Japanese general staff than the demands that the Poles made, and the negotiations fell through. It later developed that this failure was due to a dispatch from the Japanese ambassador in London, who informed his Government not to support any Polish political plans because England would not tolerate any fighting on the European continent. After a visit of two weeks Pilsudski took his leave of Tokyo.

In departing, one of the two Japanese who accompanied Pilsudski—and they were Major Inagaki and Mr. Kawakami, who later became the first Japanese Minister to Warsaw—declared that the Japanese Government could not enter into any engagement on the Polish question but that the Japanese army was ready to establish closer connections with the Polish Socialist Party. This contact was actually established. Japanese instructors later gave a special course in Switzerland to Polish revolutionaries, the details of which have not yet been revealed.

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While the Polish Socialist Party was conducting these negotiations, their local rivals, the Polish National Democrats, were also feeling out Tokyo. Their leader, Roman Dmowski, appeared in Tokyo in the middle of May, 1904, about two months ahead of Pilsudski. He himself later explained that the sole purpose of his journey had been to block the activities of the Polish Socialist Party and thus protect Poland against revolutionary uprisings. Later on, his brief statements were publicly amplified, a

development that is of particular interest not only on its own account but in relation to the man responsible for it.

His name is James Douglas, a Polonized Anglo-Saxon who is now Polish consul general in Harbin. In 1904 Douglas, a secret member of the Polish Socialist Party, was serving as Tokyo correspondent for the National Democratic *Slowo Polskie*. He was assigned the task of preparing the ground and keeping the Polish Socialist Party informed about Japan and about the activities of the Polish National Democrats. When Dmowski, the National Democratic leader, arrived in Tokyo, he naturally got in touch with Douglas immediately. In a letter dated June 17, 1904, Douglas told the Polish Socialist Party that Dmowski had been in Tokyo since the middle of May and that Yamaza, director of the Political Department in the Foreign Ministry, and General Fukushima, of the general staff, had received him. He also revealed that Dmowski had submitted two memoranda to the Japanese, one of which dealt with conditions in Russia and the other with the Polish question.

The second memorandum Dmowski

devoted to the importance of the Polish question, to Russian domestic policy, to the attitude of Poland toward the nations that had partitioned its territory, and to the political parties in Poland. Dmowski also wrote an appeal to Polish soldiers fighting in the Russian army urging them to surrender and let themselves be imprisoned by the Japanese. This appeal was, of course, signed by the Japanese Government.

Douglas lived in the same house with an individual who later came to possess some importance. Koki Hirota, then a fourth-year student of jurisprudence, was assigned to Douglas by the Japanese, who wanted to keep informed of Douglas's activities. As long as Hirota lived with Douglas, he lived at Douglas's expense in accordance with the Pole's desires. To-day he is Japan's Foreign Minister.

After spending a number of months in Tokyo, Dmowski finally returned empty-handed. He wanted less and offered less than Pilsudski. As for Pilsudski, he rightly regarded the Japanese episode, though it did not lead immediately to the complete success he had hoped for, as an undertaking of no small importance.