

Spis załączników.

1. Memoryał K.O.N. 8 sierpnia 1917. +
2. List Prezydenta Wilsona 21 sierpnia 1917. +
3. Memoryał K.O.N. 1 grudnia 1917. +
4. List sekretarza Lansinga 10 grudnia 1917. +
5. List Kużakowskiego 14 grudnia 1917. +
6. List W. Wildera 18 grudnia 1917. +
7. List W. Wildera 17 grudnia 1917. X
8. List sekretarza Lansinga 26 grudnia 1917. X
9. Kopia depeszy prezydenta Wilsona 14 grudnia 1917. X
10. List Wildera do McCormicka 7 marca 1918. X
11. Odpowiedź Kużakowskiego do kapitana Dalrymple'a ,maj 1918. +
12. Memoryał Jechalskiego do pułkownika Housa. +
13. Telegram Codzienny 29 kwietnia 1919. +
14. " " 30 maja 1919. +
15. " " 4 czerwca 1919. +
16. " " 9 " " +
17. Dziennik Ludowy, 29 lipca 1919. +
18. John Dewey, raport o sprawie polskiej + (broszura)
19. B. Kużakowski, Poland as a factor in international politics. + (broszura)
20. Wici 12 czerwca 1917. +
21. " 23 stycznia 1918. +
22. " 18 czerwca 1918. +
23. " 28 października 1915.
24. Sprawozdanie z sejmiku w Detroit. (broszura)
25. Wici, 3 czerwca 1915.
26. K.O.N. do Vevey
27. Memoryał K.O.N. 4 lipca 1915.
28. " K.O.N. 25 maja 1916. X
29. List K.O.N. do Pres. Wilsona 12 l. 1918 X
18 sierpnia 1919

B. Kużakowski

WACELNIK GOŚCINNY WOJSKA POLSKIEGO
ADJUTANTURA GENERALNA
WARSZAWA
1667/8
dnia 6 X 1919 r.
30

z załącznik 30. Do Ogłoszenia Polskiego w Ameryce.
Oderwa K.O.N.

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Memorial Agency pres K.O.W.
Prezydentowski i Sekretarowski
a dnia 8 sierpnia 1912. (1917)

1667/55

The Political Aspirations of the Polish Nation.

The political goal of all the Poles is the re-establishment of a completely independent and free Polish State, under one, indivisible government elected by the nation on the basis of free suffrage exercised by all adult citizens without discrimination because of sex, birth, religion or financial station. The territory of the Polish State ought to include all the portions of the former Commonwealth of Poland, which was the first federal state in the world, formed through voluntary union based on the covenants of Lublin and Hadziacz, of the Polish, the Lithuanian and the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) nations. As a point of departure must serve the frontiers as they were in 1772 with a rectification which would take into consideration requirements of politice-legal nature, viz., that every nation should be free to decide on its form of government and its political allegiance. As far as the Polish question is concerned, this rectification means in practice, on the one hand the adding to the Polish State of the essentially Polish provinces of Upper and Lower Silesia and of Prussian Masovia, which did not form part of Polish territory in 1772 and on the other hand the granting to the Lithuanian and the Ukrainian nations of the right to either sever the political union with the Polish nation and to form independent states or to remain in the union based on a federal constitution amended in accordance with modern requirements.

We are in the possession of a solemn declaration of all Polish political parties of May 22, 1917, on the subject in question.

The International Importance of the Polish Question.

The above solution of the Polish question definitely settles

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all international complications and disturbances dating back to the end of the XVIII century, that is to the dismemberment of the Commonwealth of Poland.

It is superfluous to repeat in this connection the old and well known fact that the dismemberment of Poland became the basis for the excessive growth of the power of Russia and of Prussia. The rapacious but poor, diminutive Prussian Duchy, barely existing on the sandy Brandenburgian soil grew to be a world power on the Polish coal, mined in the Silesian basin and the forcible labor and sweat of Polish people. Russia, through occupying Polish territory entered the family of European nations, bringing into the latter at the same time the demoralizing element of Asiatic despotism and caesaro-papism.

The destruction by the absolutistic monarchies of Poland, the only parliamentary body politic on the continent of Europe, a state which as early as the XV century put into effect the principle of habeas corpus (the Polish legal formula read as follows: "neminem captivabimus nisi jure victum") combined once for all the cause of the re-establishment of Poland with the cause of the triumph of democracy throughout Europe. Hence the publicity of all Polish revolutions with the successive stages of the triumph of the principle of democracy, beginning with the wars of the Great French Revolution way down to the present intervention of the United States. The revolution of Kosciuszko saved France from defeat at the hands of a coalition of emperors and kings by diverting Prussian and Russian armies from the western to the eastern front. The Polish revolution in 1830 frustrated the armed intervention of Russia against France, where the 1st Bourbon King has been deprived of his throne and constitutional government introduced. In 1846, through the revolution

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of Cracow under the dictatorship of Tyssowski, who subsequently died as a United States citizen in Washington D. C., Poland inaugurated in Europe the so-called "Spring of Peoples". In 1863, the defeat of the Polish revolution is equivalent to the increase of the power of Prussia and is the introduction to the debacle of France in 1870-1871. The shortsightedness and selfishness of British diplomacy, which in 1863 sided with Prussia and Russia against Poland and France, paved the way for the terrible year 1914. (See: Confidential Correspondence of British Government respecting the insurrection in Poland: 1863, edited by Tytus Dilipowicz, Paris, Librairie H. LeSeudier, 1914).

Every time that central and eastern Europe is shaken by war, the Polish question comes to the surface again and again. Then the existence of Poland and of the Poles is remembered even by those who in times of peace forget that fact themselves and forbid others to write and speak about it. It suffices to recall the times of Napoleonic wars when the existence of such a thing as Poland was suddenly remembered by the very same three powers, which but a few years ago pledged themselves mutually not only not to mention the name of Poland but even to eliminate this term from the vocabulary. As soon, however, as the Poles organized the Polish Legions in order to join the eastward march of the French Revolution and to "proceed from Italy to Poland" and as soon as the victorious French and Polish arms established, on a portion of the territory of the former Commonwealth of Poland, a nucleus of resurrecting Poland--the Grand Duchy of Warsaw-, Alexander I suddenly developed an ardent desire for reconstructing Poland, of course under his suzerainty. This ardent desire, however, did not prevent him from

cynically betraying the Poles, within less than two weeks after the Polish-Russian conferences at Pulawy, in which participated also Poles from the portion of Poland held by Prussia, whom Alexander I incited to a revolution against the latter and from turning over, thus breaking his most solemn word of honor, which he pledged to the Poles, the list of Poles from the Grand Duchy of Posnania, who confided in him, to the King of Prussia. Even in this war the Germans, who but a few weeks before the outbreak of the present war put into effect the first expropriations, pursuant to the law intended for the complete depriving of the Poles of the possession of the soil of their forefathers, besought themselves of the Polish question. The same was the case with the Russians who, immediately before the war deprived the Poles of that meagre handful of liberties which the latter acquired during the revolution of 1805/1806 and who, barely few months before the outbreak of hostilities, dismissed from service of the Warsaw-Vienna Railway all the Poles employed by said railway for scores of years and replaced them by Russian employees, imported from Russia proper, who were utterly unfamiliar with railway service. As the result thereof the number of accidents on this line increased ten times.

We beg to reiterate that the Polish question is not only a question of an oppressed nation but is primarily a question of international importance; the problem of lasting peace in Europe depends on the proper formulation and solution of the Polish question.

Lines along which the Polish Policy Proceeded Before and During the War.

For many years prior to the outbreak of the present war, Polish statesmen were convinced of the fact that an international con-

flict was bound to break out in the near future. A moment unique since the time of the partitions of Poland was approaching: the alliance concluded between the three partitioning powers over the body of prestrated Poland was to be broken for the first time in over a century. A conflict of interests between Austria and Germany on one side and Russia on the other side would thus arise at least for the duration of the war. Poland was in the first place confronted by the necessity of a decision whether she ought to take an active part in the coming war or whether she should humbly wait for what others will decide as to her destiny. In case the decision went in favor of a policy of action it remained to be decided against whom should Poland turn in this war.

This dilemma was the basis for the split in the Polish policy, split which prevails to this very moment and which is a turning point of the present events, as we will endeavor to show on the following pages.

In this connection, however, we must protest energetically against the argument spread broadcastly by the opponents of independence for Poland, that the split in the Polish policy in the present war is a proof of Poland's unfitness for independent political life. This argument is a favorite commonplace indulged in freely by the Prussian government and until late also by the government of the Tsar. It is being readily repeated by British statesmen, including Mr. Balfour. There obtain in Poland the same conditions which prevail in western Europe. The political parties are based on conflicting economic interests. In Poland, just as in the rest of Europe, the reactionary party is extremely powerful. The Prussian Junker class corresponds to the British Lords, to the Hungarian Magnates

and to the anti-democratic parties in Poland. The latter dreaded the growth of democratic institutions in an independent Poland. The form of government as it prevailed in Russia corresponded to their social views and to their interests. In exchange for a certain degree of extension of national rights, particularly with regard to the use of the Polish language in the schools and in the home-rule of urban and rural municipalities, they were willing to forego insisting on independence and to agree to a permanent union with Russia of the Tsars, which was the bulwark of reaction in Europe. Besides, they had the backing of a very generally accepted, though fundamentally wrong theory, that the separation of Poland from Russia would completely ruin the Polish industry. The diversity of the decision as to the direction of Polish policy during the war was the natural result of the disparity of economic interests of certain classes of the Polish nation and of their political opinions. The United States was far from proving their unfitness for independent political life by the fact that at the turning point of its history it had a Tory party, which was decidedly opposed to revolution. The partisans of Great Britain in Washington's days correspond in full to the Polish Russophiles in the days of Pilsudski. The representatives of the party, which was very unjustly called pre-Ally because of a certain community of interests during the war, steadily opposed in the Russian Duma the principles of general suffrage as contained in the plan for the home-rule for the City of Warsaw, etc. Members of the Duma hailing from the political party in question, failed to sign the act of protest drafted in Wiborg in 1906 against the dissolution of the first Duma. We should remember that because of the disparity of opinions entertained by the people of the United

States and by the government of the Tsar on the subject of civic rights, it was utterly impossible for the United States Government to ally itself with Russia. The outbreak of the revolution in Russia and the downfall of her absolutistic regime at once removed all the obstacles and war against Germany was declared.

No wonder therefore that in Poland also the policy proceeded along two different lines. The Conservative Party, however, did not declare itself openly as a partisan of Russia. Outwardly said party assumed the character of neutrality and centered all its efforts on counteracting the idea of a policy of action on the part of the Polish nation in the present war. It combated in the first place the Polish military schools that were being secretly organized in the Kingdom of Poland and in Galicia, the same schools in which were trained the excellent officers of the Polish-Legions. The Conservative Party opposed the idea of Polish preparedness. They pushed their policy of destroying the idea of action on the part of the Polish nation so far that the same Polish statesmen from the party in question, who two months prior to the outbreak of the war, at a secret meeting in the house of Mr. Thaddeus Cienki at Pieniaki in Galicia decided to side with Russia in case of war, voluntarily joined when the war actually broke out the anti-Russian Supreme National Committee (Naczelny Komitet Narodowy) which was organizing Polish Legions against Russia only for the purpose of introducing elements of disorganization into the said committee. They succeeded in destroying the so-called Eastern Legion. As soon as Lwow was occupied by the Russian armies they openly sided with Russia and when the Russians had to abandon Lwow they departed for Petrograd, Moscow and London. These men filed a protest against the recognition of the independence of the Kingdom of Poland by the Central Powers.

The Progressive Party had no need of hiding its policy for the same reasons for which the Conservative Party had to don the mask of neutrality. Every family in Poland had too many bloody and terrible memories that it could have been possible for Poland to side with Russia, contrary to the national tradition. Beside the national sentiment, the political wisdom spoke in favor of siding against Russia.

In the first place the prtisans of a policy of action among the Poles knew very well that Russia, because of lack of communication facilities, because of the immense corruption prevailling in the Russian bureaucracy and in particular in the commissary department of the army, because of the lack of factories producing arms and ammunition, because of the backwardness of her industry, agriculture and social organization and last but not least because of the illiteracy of her masses must suffer a defeat at the hands of Germany and Austria. On the Western front, according to Polish military experts Germany would not be able to overthrow Great Britain and France and a draw would be the result. Of course, the most advantageous combination for the Poles would be a defeat of Russia at the hands of Germany and Austria and at the same time a defeat of Germany on the Western front. Without the assistance of the United States, however, this result could not be anticipated.

Secondly, Russia had grabbed four-fifths of the territory of the former Commonwealth of Poland. The former frontier line of Poland, the rivers Dvina and Dnieper is at the same time the strategic frontier between the East and the West. It was a mistake on the part of Napoleon to have crossed this line contrary to the advises of Polish generals. It would be a mistake on the part of the Germans if they should fail to reach this line. The struggle between Po-

land and Russia for the possession of this frontier line lasted for four hundred years. The union between Poland, Lithuania and Ruthenia had among others also a very deep strategic reason. This is still the case and for this reason the question of re-establishing of a Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian federation is one of the conditions of a lasting peace. The loss of the Dvina-Dnieper line brought to Poland the loss of her independence. In order, therefore, to safeguard their own interests the Germans had to push the Russians behind this line. The annexation, however, of these immense territories, twice the size of the German Empire would deprive Germany of the greatest source of her power, viz., of her national uniformity.

The opposition made by the conquered peoples would have a very great importance; together with the German socialists these conquered peoples could paralyze and finally overthrow the rule of the Hohenzollerns. It is a wrong policy to attribute stupidity or suicidal intentions to an adversary. It was, therefore, obvious that the Germans will have to push the Russians behind the line of the Dvina-Dnieper rivers but that they will not at the same time annex these territories notwithstanding the fact that there would be found in Germany a number of elements favoring annexation. The only way out of the tangle was therefore the re-establishment of Poland and Lithuania. The act of November 5, 1916 and the organization of a separate government for Lithuania is the best proof that Polish statesmen of the Progressive Party were not mistaken in their anticipations. It was, of course, in the interest of Germany to hold the liberated territories in a condition of greatest possible dependence from Germany. On the other hand, however, this dependence could change radically as soon as the national strength of the Poles increased.

The strength, however, is best developed in struggle. For this reason the partisans of a policy of action on the part of the Polish nation put no confidence in the mendacious promises held out by the Tsar's government, which was doomed to fall sooner or later.

They were confirmed in their belief that the manifesto of the Grand Duke was nothing but a conscious fraud, which was synchronous with the decree of the Russian censor's office, prohibiting the newspapers from commenting on and discussing the Polish question. At the same time the French Government forbade the press in France to write on the subject of the independence of Poland. The Poles were soon informed of an agreement made between Russia, France and Great Britain to that effect that the Polish question is to be excluded as an internal problem of Russia from the program of the discussions of the peace congress. What on the other hand the Poles could expect from the Tsar's Government was best demonstrated by the rule of Count Bobrinsky in that portion of Galicia, which was occupied by the Russians. For this reason the Polish nation rose in arms against the Tsar and sent into battle its best sons, the Polish-Legions. The Polish nation has prepared itself through continued battle for independent political life; since November 5, 1916, the Poles in the Kingdom of Poland, deprived by Russia of all elements of political existence have been schooled in the silent and exasperated struggle with Germany for the realization of full political independence.

The third argument which prompted the Polish statesmen to side against Russia was the conviction, based on intimate knowledge of the economic, political and dynastic tendencies in Germany and in Austria, that there is a deep antagonism between these two states. As a result thereof there was added a new feature to the policy of Poland, viz., hostility against Germany besides the hostility against

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st Russia and an alliance with Austria against Germany.

A policy thus conceived has been put into effect. It became the source of the nations' strength and self-consciousness. It protected conquered and educated at the same time. While the policy of the Polish reactionaries was not able to obtain from Russia anything except empty and hazy promises that Russia would not forsake Poland after the war and while the Allies in their reply to the note of President Wilson on January 10, 1917, succeeded only to refer to the promises held out to Poland by the Tsar, the policy of the Progressive Party has very material achievements to its credit, viz., the Polish Legions, a Polish Army, the independence of the Kingdom of Poland and through the latter a seat and voice at the coming peace congress, and finally the proclamation made latterly in Cracow and in Vienna by the Polish Parliamentary Club of the Diet, of the independence of entire, united Poland with access to the sea. This proclamation was made with the tacit consent of Austria to the separation from the latter of Galicia and of Silesia. The opposition on the part of the Polish Parliamentary Club of the Vienna Reichsrath, opposition lead by one of the present originators of the policy of independence, Ignace Daszynski, became one of the contributory causes of the present crisis in Germany connected with the chancellorship of the German Empire, crisis which was undoubtedly inspired and directed by Austria. Thus, Austria because of her friendliness to the cause of Poland is emancipating herself from the absolute domination by Germany and begins to exercise her own influence upon the course of events.

The struggle conducted by the Provisional Council of State at Warsaw on the subject of the putting into effect of the act of the independence of Poland of November 5, 1916 and the clear and determine policy of the Polish Parliamentary Club in the Vienna

Reichsrath, together with the revolution in Russia, brought the question of Poland to a critical point.

The first goal of the policy of the Independence Party has already been reached. There are no longer any Russian armies in that part of the former Commonwealth of Poland that was grabbed and held by Russia. Tsardom fell and the Russian Republic recognized the independence of Poland.

The Independence Party is confronted by the task of liberating the Polish territories from the Germans. This task is both exceedingly hard and dangerous. Political liberation, which would inaugurate a new era in Europe, cannot be the subject of frivolous projects.

That this critical point should be taken advantage of for the benefit of democracy and of liberty depends at present only and solely on the United States of America. What has been started by a nation in bondage for now over a hundred years but still weighing heavily on the future destiny of Europe and able to conduct its own policy, exceedingly intricate and subject to most unfavorable conditions, should be accomplished and brought to a happy solution by the most powerful nation at the present time, a nation which was born out of a struggle for independence and freedom.

Hitherto Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany promised and announced that they will solve the Polish question without the cooperation of the Poles. The democratic United States proclaimed the principle, that the peoples should decide themselves on the question of their respective destinies and of their political allegiance.

The United States alone is willing to solve the question of Po-

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land jointly with the Poles themselves.

With this firm conviction the Polish National Defense Committee addresses itself to the Government of the United States.

The Polish National Defense Committee in the United States.

Before discussing, however, the points of our petition, we deem it necessary to say a few words in our behalf.

Our organization originated on December 16, 1912 at a convention of all Polish organizations in the United States without exception, which was held in Pittsburgh, Pa. There arrived at that time from Poland the news of the organization of a Committee of Confederated Polish Independence Parties, which made it its object to consolidate the Polish policy in view of the then impending world war and to perfect the technical preparations for an active participation of the Poles in this war for the purpose of regaining independence for Poland. At this convention, after the address of the undersigned, Alexander Dembski, confidential agent of the Polish Independence Party, who explained the objects and the aspirations of the Poles in Europe, the co-author of the present memorandum, Brenislav D. Kulakowski a delegate of the Alliance of Active Struggle (Zwiazek Walki Czynnej), A Polish military organization, presented the following resolution:

"In view of the fact that we recognize the duty of cooperating with our native land in any action, having for its object the restitution of political independence to Poland, we deem it proper and resolve to organize a Polish National Defense Committee on the basis of a resolution passed by the National Convention of the representatives of Polish organizations and of the Polish press, on the sixteenth day of December, 1912 in the City of Pittsburgh, State of Pennsylvania to wit:

The representatives of all Polish organizations and societies in the United States of America in convention assembled in the City of Pittsburgh, on December 16, 1912 unanimously passed the following resolution:

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Separated by thousands of miles from Poland and unable to take an active part in the nations's policy we herewith submit unconditionally to the dictates of the Confederated Independence Parties of Poland, represented by their respective delegates at a convention in Zakepane in the Fall of 1912 and forming at the present time the Polish Military Treasury (Polski Skarb Wojskowy). In accordance with the political orientation as established previously in Poland by the aforementioned parties, we resolve to support with all our power the revolutionary movement against Russia, the greatest enemy of Poland, the champion of oppression, denationalization, barbarism and ignorance as well as the permanent gendarme of absolutism in Europe.

In order to be able to render this assistance we resolve to organize the Polish National Defense Committee. Long live the armed struggle, longlive liberty, long live the Independent Commonwealth of Poland."

The above resolution has been passed by acclamation and sworn to by all the Polish organizations in the United States. Several Polish organizations, however, saw fit later on to abandon the principles as set forth in their resolution. Those, however, who to this very day stand by the Polish National Defense Committee are of the opinion, just as they were of old, that in the first place, Polish policy can only be directed by the Poles in Poland, and that the Poles who emigrated to foreign countries have no right whatsoever to impose upon Poland and in particular against the latter's knowledge and consent, any policy and still less have they the right to form usurpatory governments and conclude alliances; and secondly, that in accordance with the above principle they have the duty of counteracting all attempts at settling the Polish question without the cooperation of Poland herself and that they must direct all their activities towards the establishing of relations between the governments of nations friendly disposed for Poland and the national authorities in Poland. The entire outward activity of the Polish National Defense Committee, beginning with the action in behalf of the relief for the starving population of Poland and the memorandum submitted in May 1916 to Hon. Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States and to all Ambassadors accredited with the United States Gov-

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ernment at Washington and ending with the petition to President Wilson in re continuation in office of the United States Consul in Warsaw, notwithstanding the breaking off of the diplomatic relations between the United States and the German Empire, had the above mentioned principles as its object.

In Re United States Agent for Polish Matters.

The immediate object of our endeavors is the appointment by the Government of the United States of a special agent for Polish matters whose task would be the establishing of direct relations between the United States and the nucleus of the National Government of Poland, the Council of State in Warsaw and the Polish Parliamentary Club in Vienna or such groups or organizations in Poland which would be able to act in the name of the above mentioned bodies.

We are of the opinion, that such an understanding must by all means precede any action in regard to Poland on the part of the Allies. Poland has a perfect confidence in the United States. President Wilson was the only one of the representatives of all the nations to formulate clearly and plainly the opinion of the American nation with regard to Poland; he was the only one to proclaim, without any opportunistic consideration, the complete independence and liberty of Poland as a condition sine qua non of a lasting peace.

The armed force of Poland might decide the fate of Europe. Poland, however, will not permit to be used for purposes which are foreign to her interests. She will negotiate only with that nation in which she has absolute confidence, whose certificate of birth, the immortal Declaration of Independence she is acquainted with and whose recent act of liberating Cuba she well remembers. As a contrast to the American attitude with regard to the question of Poland we beg

to quote the opinion of an English writer as to the point of view of all the European powers, without exception on the Polish cause:

"At present the tendency of all belligerents is to think of the Poles simply as a source of Man-power, which may yield two million bayonets. The Polish Question means for the "Powers" simply the distribution of these bayonets in the future military balance of Europe. We shall not "crush militarism" while we submit to this way of thinking. The Poles must settle their own destinies, and the only policy worthy of liberal Powers would be to insist that they shall have liberty to choose freely". (From "A League of Nations" by Henry Noel Brailsford, New York, The Macmillan Company, page 114-115.)

We are sure of the fact, that the interest of the Polish nation proceeded ever since the dawn of Polish history along the lines of democracy and of liberty. At all times and under the most dangerous circumstances even the Poles fought in the defense of progress; the motto of Pulaski that "wherever they fight for liberty is as if they were fighting for Poland" remained to this very day the motto of the Polish nation. But no one has the right to send the Poles into battle without the consent and an order to that effect of the Polish nation and in particular they do not possess this right who for the three long years of the present war failed to establish any sincere relations with the Polish cause, who were not able to go beyond commonplaces but who never ceased to picture Poland as a "medley of nationalities". Words will no longer suffice nor will be sufficient the formation of a Polish army in France after Polish soldiers were tossed around and herded together with the rabble of the Foreign Legion, after the censorship in France prohibited to mention the independence of Poland!

We understand perfectly that by now the Allies might have become aware of the importance of the Polish nation and that they might be willing now to enter in accordance with Brailsford's wishes upon the only proper road, so excellently pointed out by him. The

Allies, however, must reckon with the diffidence of the Poles, diffidence the seed of which they have planted themselves.

In order to set matters right it is imperative that all negotiations with irresponsible Polish groups abroad, with regard to organizing of usurpatory Polish governments and exotic Polish armies be discontinued and that negotiations be conducted directly with the Polish nation through the mediation of the United States, the only sincere friend, who enjoys the implicit confidence of Poland.

We must point out in this connection with full emphasis that all political parties in Poland are opposed to the Poles living abroad in Europe or in Europe or in the United States imposing any influence on the course of the Polish national policy. Twenty odd millions of Poles of all classes of society living on their own soil, have undoubtedly more to say with regard to Polish matters than an insignificant number of emigrants, belonging to the intelligent classes of professionals and artists or even a large number of laborers, not possessing any real property and living abroad only for the reason of earning higher wages. No Polish government organized abroad, without the consent and the sanction of the Council of State at Warsaw, of the Polish Parliamentary Club in Vienna or the Polish Parliamentary Club in Berlin, will be recognized in Poland, and , it will always be considered in Poland as usurpatory. For this reason such a government will be unable to mobilize the Polish forces and what is more, will insult the Polish national pride by ignoring the leading resident elements of the nation.

For the same reason we are opposed to any attempts of organizing Polish armies outside of Polish territory without the sanction of the leading political bodies in Poland, which are sharing the privations as inflicted by the shortage of food and the devastation

caused by the war, with the entire nation. An army can be organized and fight only by order of a national government. In any other case it is a negation of the idea of state, is at best nothing but a "condottieri" institution and is any event a negation of the principle of democracy. For this reason all attempts at organizing a Polish army in Russia failed. The Polish soldiers in the Russian army declared that they will await the orders of the governing bodies of Poland. Equally the idea of a Polish army in France has failed. Also here, in the United States, we opposed the formation of a "Kosciusko Army" on the ground that such an army would constitute a negation of the state idea of Poland and of the United States as well and we encouraged instead the Poles in this country to enlist in the army of the United States.

What Should Be Remembered.

The events of the European war did not fail to teach the Poles a lesson. We are familiar with and we remember the waste of blood of the heroic Australian and Canadian regiments in Gallipoli; we knew the fate which befell Roumania, we anticipate the fate of the Salonica expedition.

We want a strong, independent Poland and our efforts are directed towards reaching this goal. We will, however, not risk the achievements purchased through the efforts of the entire Polish nation.

Poland is facing a crucial moment of her history. She has undergone extremely hard trials. Among the masses of the Polish people there is spreading the fear of the German power. The crumbling of the Russian front tends to indicate that the Germans will not find a check for their lust of conquest in a strong democratic Russia,

allied with Poland. Besides, the unequivocal attitude of the Provisional Russian Government, attitude which is hostile to the independence of Finland is likely to create among the Poles the suspicion, that in the relations between Poland and Russia we Poles might suddenly encounter some surprises, which would shatter the belief in the right of all nations to decide their own destinies, right proclaimed by the Provisional Russian Government. The mention that was made in the Russian proclamation, of a military union between Russia and Poland and the making of further steps in the question of Poland dependent on the action of the Russian Constitutional Assembly, are liable to create suspicion that the future relations between Russia and Poland might have just that kind of a character that the Government of Berlin is dreaming about of imposing upon Poland. Even the most frivolous Polish statesman will not dare to shed the blood and expose the entire nation to the vengeance of Germany and the country to utter devastation without having the security, that the change thus produced will be a change for the better and that Poland will not be abandoned at the critical moment to her own fate as was Servia and that when finally assistance will be given, it will be given so that from some other Salonica the rescuers will look at the grave of an entire people. The playing of the trump card of 700,000 Polish soldiers in Russia and of a certain number of Polish volunteers in France, without the consent and the assistance of the Poles in Poland would be a waste of ammunition and a useless sacrifice of human life.

And still there never was a more favorable moment for entering into relations with Poland. The Germans put Pilsudski, the first Pole since Kosciuszke, to enjoy the love of the entire nation under arrest. In so far as credence can be given to despatches, the Ger-

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mans succeeded temporarily, speculating with the fact of the Russian defeat, in persuading the opportunistic, wealthy and therefore less inclined to risk elements in the Council of State, to agree to a "military union" with Germany or in other words to accept without any losses such political status, as was proposed to Poland by the Provisional Russian Government in exchange for the Poles joining an armed action against Germany. In case the Germans did actually succeed in doing so, they spoiled their success by the arrest of Pilsudski; furthermore the Poles of Galicia, who exercise considerable influence upon the Austrian Government are antagonistic to the Germans.

The arrival at Warsaw of Count Adam Tarnowski, for the purpose of forming a Polish cabinet tends to show that Austria is backing the endeavors of Poland towards an emancipation from the influence of Germany.

The Germans are perfectly well aware of the value and of the importance of the potential strength of Poland. An aggressive state like Germany, proudly conscious of its own enormous power, by virtue of which it was able to withstand so far the attack of nearly the entire world, deemed it proper to change the policy of extermination hitherto practiced with regard to the Poles and by recognizing the independence of the Kingdom of Poland placed the Polish question on the basis of independent political existence.

In order to understand the value and the importance of the Polish nation in the present war, we must in the first place take into consideration the moral and material resources of the Polish people.

Out of a total number of twenty five millions of Poles (according to Prof. Eugene Romer twenty eight millions), four millions inhabit the Polish territory held by Prussia, five millions the territory held by Austria, thirteen millions the portion of Poland held by Russia, while the balance is scattered in America and in other parts of the world.

Deducting the losses in killed and wounded there are still at least 2,000,000 Poles in the German army, 350,000 in the Austro-Hungarian army and 700,000 in the Russian army. The number of recruits in the Kingdom of Poland, who were not drafted into service by Russia amounted to about 600,000, which number, under the present system of unrestricted recruiting as it is applied in the third year of the war by Germany and France for instance, could be increased to about one million men.

As the elimination of the Poles from the German army is impossible for the time being, owing to the Prussian system of formation and distribution of tactical units, the Polish national policy can dispose at present, for any action, taking also into consideration the changes which occurred in Russia with regard to the rights of nationalities, of the following numbers:

1. about one million of potential soldiers in the Kingdom of Poland, with excellent skeleton formation consisting of the Polish Legions, which have a war experience of three years;
2. about 700,000 of drilled soldiers in the Russian army, with 19,000 officers and 110 general officers, all Poles, who will obey the orders of the legitimate Polish Government, which they have recognized in the Council of State of Warsaw;
3. about 350,000 of Polish soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian army, with the necessary number of Polish officers of all grades,

who will obey the dictates of the Polish Parliamentary Club of the Vienna Reichsrath.

This given in total about two millions of first class soldiers. It should be borne in mind, that in the most hazardous attacks in this war, the Germans, the Austrians and the Russians as well used the Poles as the most daring and tenacious fighters. The first attack of the Germans on Warsaw, was beaten back by Siberian regiments, in which there were forty per cent. of Poles; the forts of Douaumont and Vaux were taken by Landwehr troops ^{from} the Polish provinces of Posenania and Silesia; the Russians were severely beaten at Krasnik by Galician regiments and the bravery of the Polish Legions became legendary with both sides on the Eastern war theatre.

The Moral Ressources of the Polish Nation.

Under moral resources in the political sense, we understand the national unity and the comprehension of the importance of independence to national life. The attachment of the Poles to their nationality became proverbial. The persecution of the Poles by the Prussians and the Russians not only failed to break the national spirit but on the contrary produced a national mysticism. The theory that Poland is the Christ of nations, who by his martyrdom will redeem the sins of mankind committed through oppression and violence, as proclaimed by Polish poets and philosophers, is generally known.

The present war, in which for the first time since the partitions of Poland, the partitioning powers came to blows between themselves, convinced the Poles, that only in this war can they regain their independence. To their attachment to their nationality,

which is rather an element of defense, there was added an aggressive element, viz., the tendency to take advantage of the unique moment in the world's history for the purpose of re-establishing an independent Polish state. The proclamation of the Central Powers of November 5, 1916, although it failed to satisfy the Poles in full, strengthened materially the party advocating a policy of action. The very moment that Prussia, who most systematically endeavored to denationalize the Poles, had to abandon the traditional Bismarckian theory, that an independent Poland would mean the downfall of Prussia as a world power, the partisans of an active policy on the part of the Poles saw another proof of the correctness of their policy. Through the recognition of the Kingdom of Poland as an independent political entity by the Central Powers, the Poles have acquired the right to be represented and to raise their voice at the coming peace congress, a right which was denied to them hitherto by the Allies, because Great Britain and France pledged themselves to Russia not to recognize the Polish question as an international problem but merely as an internal problem of Russia. The struggle between the Council of State of the Kingdom of Poland and the German Government over the extension of the former's scope of authority and over the definite putting into effect of the manifesto of November 5, 1916, constitutes an excellent school of statesmanship for the Polish nation. The latter's consciousness grown very rapidly and the Prussians are getting aware of the fact that there is growing at their elbow a power with which they must reckon. The Polish nation already considers itself master of the territory of the Kingdom of Poland and insists in terms, which are far from being equivocal, upon the elimination of the Germans from cooperation

in the administration of the territory occupied by their army. For this very reason, the protest against the recognition of the independence of the Kingdom of Poland by the Central Powers, protest made by the reactionary parties of the Poles residing abroad, was not only directly inconsistent with international law (see the Memorandum of the Polish National Defense Committee to the Ambassadors of May 1916), inconsistent with the premises and the sacrifices of the Revolution of 1830-1831 but also directly harmful to the Polish policy of action since it reduced materially, very much to the benefit of Germany, the importance of this first victory of the Polish policy of independence with regard to Germany and to the international law as well.

It must be emphasized that Germany decided upon the recognition of the independence of the Kingdom of Poland not only because of the obvious impossibility of absorbing and germanizing the Poles and because of the pressure of the politically constructive forces of the Polish nation but also because Germany wanted to avoid a solution much worse to herself, viz., the idea of a trifism, idea much advocated by Austria, consisting of a federal state formed by Austria, Hungary and Poland. Such a federal state would be without doubt run by the Poles, who ever since the beginning of the constitutional era exercised an immense influence upon the destinies of Austria, saving her in the first place from financial disaster by giving to Austria a series of brilliant ministers of finance like Dunajewski, Nilinski, Korytowski and Zaleski. Austria-Hungary-Poland would assemble in their fold all Slav nations and would draw the Balkan Peninsula into its sphere of influence, thus putting into effect, after a lapse of three hundred years, the Jagellonic idea of a Polish political statebody, based on a voluntary union of nations. It is obvious that a dangerous competitor would

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thus arise for Germany.

The latter chose the lesser evil as far as her interests were concerned and recognized the independence of the Kingdom of Poland, which in accordance with international law was and is a subject of the law of nations. The Poles took advantage of the situation; they reconstructed the Polish public education completely ruined by Russia, introduced Polish courts of justice, began to work on the rebuilding of the country devastated by the war and at the same time started the struggle with Germany on the subject of putting forthwith into effect the fact of independence. The main point of the struggle was the question of rendering the Polish army independent from German command. This struggle even lead to the arrest of Joseph Pilsudski, the man who built the army of Poland.

The Polish statesmen of Galicia on the other hand raised again the idea of uniting all Polish territories but not in union with Austria-Hungary and on May 28, 1917, proclaimed in Cracow, a united Poland with access to the sea. Any impartial observer cannot fail to connect this exceedingly courageous and even risky step taken by the Poles with the address of President Wilson on January 22, 1917, which address was the first utterance since the beginning of the war, made to the Poles and stating, that Poland is not only an object of barter and a reservoir of soldiers to fight for foreign interests, but that she has beyond the seas a true and honest friend, the United States of America. The demonstrations in honor of the United States and of President Wilson corroborate the truth of our statement.

Recapitulations

The actual situation in Poland presents itself therefore as

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follows:

1. Poland has a supply of two millions of first class soldiers;
2. Poland will sacrifice this soldier-material only for the make of Polish interests, that is for the purpose of re-establishing a united and independent Poland;
- 3 3. Poland will sacrifice her supply of men only upon order of the legitimate government, elected in Poland and not abroad;
4. Poland will attract to herself Austria and all Slav nations

For the purpose of putting into effect these changes in the distribution of forces in Central Europe, the appointment and despatching to Europe of a diplomatic agent of the United States for Polish matters cannot be dispensed with.

The appointment of such an agent is conforming with the legal conception and the practice of the United States Government.

Precedents in the History of Diplomacy of the United States.

On June 18, 1849 upon order of the President of the United States, Zachary Taylor, Mr. S. Dudley Mann has been appointed special agent "to inquire into the situation in Hungary". In the instruction signed by the Secretary of State, Clayborn, we read as follows:

"Should the new government prove to be, in your opinion, firm and stable,..... you might intimate, if you should see fit, that the president would, in that event, be gratified to receive a diplomatic agent from Hungary to the United States by or before the next meeting of Congress, and that he entertains no doubt whatever that, in case her new government should prove to be firm and stable her independence would be speedily recognized by that enlightened body."

The instruction, which has been handed to Mr. Mann, characterizes him as a "special and confidential agent of the United States

to Hungary" and in his annual message President Taylor defined the

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position of the United States with regard to an oppressed nation fighting for its independence as follows:

"During the late conflict between Austria and Hungary there seemed to be a prospect that the latter might become an independent nation. However faint that prospect at the time appeared? I thought it my duty, in accordance with the general sentiment of the American people, who deeply sympathize with the Magyar patriots, to stand prepared upon the contingency of the establishment by her of a permanent government, to be the first to welcome independent Hungary into the family of nations. For this purpose I invested an agent, then in Europe, with the power to declare our willingness promptly to recognize her independence in the event of her ability to sustain it."

The precedent as in the case with Hungary is perfectly sufficient as far as the legal basis for appointing an agent to the revolutionary government is concerned. As we know, Austria protested against the mission of Mr. Dudley Mann to which protest the Secretary of State, Daniel Webster made his famous reply.

In the diplomatic conflict between the United States and Mexico because of the appointment by the United States Government of Mr. Alocé La Branche to the post of a diplomatic agent to Texas, the Secretary of State, Mr. Forayth defined the legal opinion of the Government of the United States as follows:

"The independence of other nations has always been regarded by the United States as a question of fact merely."

With regard to the independence of Cuba, the United States, have established an extremely important precedent; on December 7, 1897, the Secretary of State, Richard Olney received the accrediting papers from Mr. T. Estrada Palma, who called himself the "authorized representative of the Cubans in arms."

Finally is it necessary to look any further for the justification of diplomatic relations between an already established state and a state in statu nascendi than to go back to the instruction, given on March 3, 1776 to Silas Deane of Connecticut, who was ordered to:

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"appear in France in the character of a merchant as the Court of France may not like it should it be known publicly that any agent from the Colonies is in that country, but to confide to Count of Vergennes that he has come upon business of the American Congress."

We all know what momentous results had the fact that France was willing to listen to that "merchant" and also to his successor, Benjamin Franklin, the father of the diplomacy of democracy.

P. V. C.

ALEXANDER DEBSKI,

BRONISLAW D. KULAKOWSKI,

STANISLAW RAYZACHER

For the Polish National Defense
Committee.

*Zaswiadczenie niniejszym, że
kopia niniejsza jest zgodna
z oryginałem, pisany ręcznie
i arcybiskupowski Królowski
Zjednoczony w dniu 8 lipca
1917 roku*

*15 lipca 1919 roku w New York
B. Kuratowski*

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II

COPY

*Copy letter President
Wilson for his review
after memorandum K.O.W.
2 on 8 August 1917 (shown
with explanation of Gold)*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

21 August, 1917

1667/55

My dear Wilder:

I have your letter of August seventeenth with
its enclosures and will, of course, have the papers you
send me very carefully reviewed.

That is all I can say at present. I need not
tell you with what sympathy I approach any question that
touches upon the independence and political future of
Poland.

In haste

Sincerely yours

(signed) WOODROW WILSON

Mr. William R. Wilder,

45 Cedar Street

New York City.

20 August 1917

W. R. Wilder

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*Przed wypowiedzeniem wojny Austrii
p. Wilder zamierza pisać o ob. Dr.
Kubackiego i rozprawić, jak jest
zdradził A.O.W. w Lejwacu. - memorandum
do przesłania do k. Sejmiku i Senatu*
MEMOANDUM.

11 XII 1912

1667/5

The daily papers have informed us that during the coming session of Congress a resolution will be introduced suggesting the declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey by the United States of America.

The Polish National Defense Committee in the certainty that this step on its part will meet with due understanding, and basing its standpoint on an accurate knowledge of European conditions, takes the liberty of presenting the following notes in this matter for consideration.

Above all we state as points requiring no proofs that

- 1) the greatest enemy of Democracy in Europe is Prussia,
- 2) Prussia is the greatest enemy of a Poland, independent, united and with access to the sea,
- 3) the weakening of Prussia is a sine qua non for the victory of Democracy over Autocracy.

Bearing the above points in mind becomes obvious that no means of weakening Prussia should be neglected. Apart from military action, political action cannot be over-looked which may drive a wedge between Prussia and the other Central Powers. All nations with the exception of the United States are waging war against the whole group of the Allied Central Powers, and for this reason ~~it~~ they cannot make full use of the different political mediums to help them along. We consider that the fact that the United States is at war solely with Germany makes it possible for the United States of America to conduct a broad-minded and far-sighted policy with regard to its relations with Austria-Hungary and with Bulgaria; the declaration of war against these powers would on the other hand, make negotiations ~~impossible~~ intended to detach Germany's allies from her almost if not quite impossible. This policy of isolation could be excellently carried out by the United States with the assistance of the Poles, thanks to the faith and grateful friendship ~~of~~ which animates the Poles with regard to the United States of America.

The position of the ~~United States~~ Polish nation in this war and especially at the present time, is exceptional, and it would be making a blunder to fail to take advantage of the situation.

Polish Statesmen proceeding after the assurance of the independence of the former Russian partition to the second stage of the fight for independence, namely to the freeing of the Austrian and German partitions and their union into a whole to make an independent Poland, have before them two undertakings each of a different nature. Firstly looking upon ~~Austria~~ Prussia as the greatest enemy they possess they must above all turn their policy against Prussia and Austria and so make certain of obtaining a voice in the conduct of Austrian policies. The antagonism existing between Austria and Germany is too well-known to demand proof, for in spite of the present alliance between these two powers, the memory of Sadowa has not yet left the Austrians. The careless treatment of the Austrian officers by the Prussian officers accompanied by their typical Prussian brutality make the Austrians feel at every turn that they possess an army which is known but for its defeats: this has caused great disheartenment and jealousy. The absolute dependence of Austria upon Prussia from an economical as well as from a political point of view together with the admitted plans of

#2.

"Mittel-Europa" have turned the manufacturing and merchant classes in Austria against Germany. It should be borne in mind likewise that besides this factor there is another one, not really economical, but not less important in the policies of the states of Europe, and that is the dynastic ambition of the Hapsburgs who have felt the encroachments of the 'par-venu' Hohenzollerns family since the year 1866. The energetic nature and independent character of the present Emperor of Austria Charles I. should be kept in mind also. Thus appear the relations of the two powers, Austria and Germany. It should be possible to multiply this antagonism many times in its intensity, when the fact is taken under consideration that the German element in Austria is but an insignificant one, and that on the other hand it is composed decidedly more of Slavonic elements, full of hatred for Germany and especially for Prussia.

The Slavonic nations of Austria and in the Balkans could not conduct a uniform policy up to the present as a result of the Russian policy for the extermination of the Poles. The Bohemians and the Slovaks and other nations too expected freedom from the hands of Russia; the Poles knew however that Russia in the event of victory over Austria would immediately endeavour to deprive the Poles of even those liberties which they had enjoyed under the Austrian Government. The administration of Bobrinsky during the temporary Russian occupation of ~~the~~ Galicia proved clearly that the Poles had not been deceived in their forebodings. At present ~~the~~ Russians having been excluded from the war as an active factor, the Austrian and the Balkan Slavs will from the nature of things, have to group themselves by the strongest Slavonic nation after Russia, a nation possessing historical tradition and political experience, that is to say the Polish nation. From the time of the economical reforms of Austria that is from the year 1866, the Poles have occupied the highest positions in Austria. Thanks to Polish economists who time after time were nominated Ministers of Finance in Austria, such as Dunajewski, Korytowski, Bilinski, the finances of Austria became solvent and certain instead of their former state of disorganization and bankruptcy. Poles such as Badeni, Goluchowski and others occupied the positions of Premiers of the Austrian Government. The Austrian court became accustomed to listen to the advice of Poles and to Polish councils. Yet simultaneously the Polish statesmen of Austria never attempted to conceal the fact that they were always working for and towards an independent Poland, and so to the separation of Galicia from Austria. The culminating expression of this relation between the Poles and the Austrians was the proclamation on the 28th May 1917 calling for an independent Poland, ~~and~~ with its three partitions united and with access to the sea. This proclamation was sounded forth in Cracow, an Austrian fortress in a state of war and in the ~~presence~~ presence of the Austrian staff and of the whole army. This act was according to the letter of the law an act of ~~the~~ treason, and yet when the Polish standard waved from the turrets of the City Hall during the reading of the Proclamation, the Austrian troops saluted it. This political paradox gives ample proof of the importance of the Poles in Austria. The meaning of this is emphasized all the more when it is realized that there exists a strong under-current among Austrian Slavs against the Germans which is guided by the Poles.

We have mentioned already that Polish policy finds itself at the second stage of its progress. This stage commenced at the time of the Russian Revolution. The act

commencement of political opposition to Prussia on the part of the Poles was in a proclamation of the State Council in Warsaw stating its neutrality towards the Russians; the refusal of Pilsudski's Legions to take the oath of brotherhood in arms with the Germans and the subsequent imprisonment of Pilsudski and his officers by the Germans, and the disarming and internment of the Polish Legions. This proclamation of the 28th May 1917 for a Poland with access to the seas definitely threatened the Germans, and this was further emphasized in a speech made by Representative Daszynski in the Viennese Parliament, in which he stated that by access to the seas, the port of Gdansk (Danzig) was indicated. This was during the existence of the Austro-German alliance, and spoken in the Austrian parliament - a statement which meant that a part of the territory of Prussia would be torn away for the benefit of Poland.

We would now desire to emphasize especially a statement given publicity by the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ American press. According to this statement the representative of Polish action for independence, Representative Daszynski demanded from the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Austrian Premier Czernin that austrian regiments composed mainly of Poles be withdrawn from the Italian front. Daszynski gave it as his motive that the Polish nation had no quarrel with the Italians. In this way the individuality and separation of the Polish nation as well as its separate ~~Polish~~ foreign policy was emphasized: that policy being far from similar to that of the Central Powers with regard to the ~~the~~ treatment of the Entente Allies. Poland is not at war with ~~the~~ the Western Allies. It was at war with Russia and this conflict ceased with the Poles obtaining their objects in the East.

The German government understands the political game of the Poles very well. It cannot however, act against them openly. One who understands and knows the cult of force and brutal oppression peculiar to the Prussians, must meditate long over the concessions made to the Poles by the Germans and which are in accordance with Germany's Polish policy at present. And one can only deduct that the Prussians have comprehended the ~~mean~~ meaning and the strength of Poland. The Allies should understand this too and not make fresh blunders by eliminating this force from among the anti-German factors of this war; and this elimination will certainly occur and at least to a great degree by a declaration of war against Austria on the part of the United States.

To what extent indeed the Germans ~~will~~ have to count with the policy of Poland (which whilst not being enforced by ~~an~~ armed force, knows still very excellently the division of strength in Central Europe), is shown in two examples which must be explained and demonstrated before we proceed.

The first example ~~occurred~~ occurred immediately after the opening of the Austrian Parliament in Vienna when the Polish Parliamentary Circle stated that the Poles would vote against the Budget for the first time in the history of parliamentary ~~government~~ government in Austria. This would mean the financial ruin of Austria and the achievement of complete political chaos in ~~that~~ that country. We do not know exactly what happened then or subsequently. We know only that the Poles voted

for the Budget immediately after the visit of the representative of the opposition in the Berlin ~~XXXXX~~ Parliament (The Catholic Center) namely Representative Erzberger who came to Vienna. After Erzberger's return to Berlin, ~~XXXXXX~~ Bethman-Hollweg fell and the whole South German press commenced a unanimous campaign against annexations, resulting in the ~~provision~~ resolution being placed in the German Parliament against any annexations on the part of Germany.

Another example of great significance was the energetic action on the ~~XXXXXX~~ part of Germany against the appointment of Count Adam Tarnowski to be Premier of the new Polish ~~XXXXXX~~ government. After a controversy lasting for two months the Germans emerged victorious and Dr. J. Kucharszewski was appointed, far behind Tarnowski in point of view of political ability as well as international prestige. The Germans have comprehended very well what a dangerous enemy Count Tarnowski was for them. Count Tarnowski would have maintained his position firmly as Premier if the policy of the Allies had in some way or other given the Poles some measure of support and no support of any kind had been given by them.

The Germans had been against Tarnowski's mission to America and it had been German influence which had led to his recall.

The whole course of the Allied policy in the East had been directed against Austria, ignoring Germany. Poland had been recognised as an internal problem of Russia's. The energy and strength of the Polish nation had been quite gratuitously dispensed with by conducting a vague and indefinite Polish policy which aroused suspicion amongst the Poles towards the Allies. Even until late the Russian Revolutionary Government had not yet been able to leave the course traced out by the policy of the Tsars with regard to Poland. Minister Tereszczenko only a few weeks before his imprisonment by the ignorant ~~XXXXXX~~ Petrograd anarchists expressed in the presence of Allied representatives a doubt whether it would be possible for Poland to realize the dream of her independence.

The Polish National Defense Committee pointed out the unusual importance of ~~XXXX~~ Poland in victory for Democracy in a memorial presented to the Government of the United States of America early in August this year. In it the fact was emphasized also that the Poles possess faith only in the United States and that they cannot commence energetic work without the assistance of the United States. We emphasized ~~this~~ also the meaning and importance of Polish policy in Austria and we indicated a means of communication between the United States and the Poles by the appointment of a ~~special~~ diplomatic agent for Polish affairs to be sent to Switzerland or to Sweden.

We do not know what has hindered this project. We know only that in spite of delays, which have acted to the detriment of the cause, the time for taking ~~XXXX~~ advantage of Polish elements and forces is not irrecoverably passed. We fear that the declaration of war against Austria by the United States of America can shut off this means of communication and if not entirely so, greatly hinder the progress of this work.

A hundred and fifty years of slavery have taught us to love the Mother-Country without any reservations. But Polish

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traditions have enjoined upon us simultaneously to fight ~~under~~ with the battle cry of "~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Through Poland for Humanity!" on our lips. In the name of this ideal we call attention to the importance of the decision which must be made by Congress. In the event of war being declared the political action of the Poles in Galicia so promisingly commenced and vigourously conducted will be paralysed. Exhaustion will take the upper hand in Poland: reactionary elements which until recently clung to Russia under the Tsars will commence to incline towards the side of ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ imperialistic Germany. Pilsudski, - the spiritual leader of Democratic Poland will remain in his prison cell. in Germany.

The isolation of Prussia by turning away Austria and Bulgaria will become a matter of impossibility. Supporters of the Hindenburg policy of annexation will commence their activities with renewed vigor. The fate of Poland thrust between the anarchy of Russia and German imperialism will again become a debatable quantity.

~~And what profit will accrue to the cause of Democracy by declaring war on Austria? We should remember that Austria, with the Russian danger past, and the threat of an Italian offensive~~
the acceptance of

The declaration of war without ~~accepting~~ the doctrines enunciated by President Wilson by the Allies would give the Germans a new proof for stating that the ideals of the Allies are insincere and that the Germans are the real defenders of the rights of nations. It should be borne in mind that all Slavonic and Lithuanian nations are isolated and can easily come under German influence and be subject to the deceiving councils of the Germans; and especially after the publication of the secret correspondence of the Russian Foreign Office in the matter of Poland, the lack of support, the failure to support the principles of the independence of all nations and instead the support by the Allies of such Polish reactionaries as Dmowski, Paderewski and others, have led to a split among the Polish soldiers of the Russian army, numbering several ~~thousands~~ hundreds of thousands of men, and whose importance the Polish National Defense Committee has been emphasized in its memorial.

And what profit will accrue to the cause of Democracy by declaring war on Austria? We should remember that Austria, with the Russian danger past, the threat of an Italian offensive on Trieste and Dalmatia over, is ~~now~~ exhausted and worn out - ready to conclude a longed-for peace. From the military as well as from the political point of view, Austria has no longer any meaning. German troops are fighting in Italy. The United States are sending troops to the French front and free in this way, English troops required in Italy. By declaring war on Austria the position of the front will not be altered nor will the intensiveness change. The Germans will be the only ones to profit and Poland, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey will become ~~its~~ their vassals. The war will be prolonged; we feel confident that the United States will conquer the Germans. We feel certain likewise that this victory will be speedier and more perfect if in co-operation with the armed action of the United States, political action will make itself felt with the aid of the Poles.

If however, important reasons should impel the Government

*Kopje liha Sekretara Stanu
Lansinga potpisano od
New Yorka 2 dec 1917 u
Svome arhivu i deku -*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 10, 1917.

1667/95

William R. Wilder, Esquire,
care Wilder, Ewen and Patterson,
45 Cedar Street, New York City.

My dear Mr. Wilder:

I duly received your letter of December 1st, with enclosures, giving the opinion of the Polish National Defense Society regarding the question of a declaration of war by the United States against Austria, and trust that you will overlook the delay in acknowledging its receipt.

In view of the President's message to Congress last week and the subsequent action of that body in declaring the existence of a state of war between the United States and Austria-Hungary, any statement of the Department of State in the premises would appear to be unnecessary.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Robert Lansing.

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2 a zgodni i zgodni

Robert Lansing

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V
Po wypowiedzeniu wojny Austrii
przez H. L. G. pan Wilder rozumie
się do ob. Kubaśkowskiego z raportu
również, jak K. O. W. Kaputych i) na
dalsze polityce -
New York, December 14, 1917.
List ten jest odpowiedź na raport

Dear Mr. Wilder:

The memorandum written by the Polish National Defense Committee and sent through your courtesy to Secretary of State Lansing, contained the following passage:

"If, however, important reasons should impel the Government of the United States to declare war (on Austro-Hungary) it would be advisable to maintain relations with Poland. The road to this will be more difficult but we have learned in the century and a half of our national struggle to work under difficult and hampering conditions."

War was declared on Austria-Hungary. However, President Wilson uttered words in his speech which filled us all with joy, for he assured Poland her right to free access to the sea and defined further the attitude of the nations composing the Austro-Hungarian monarchy with regard to their duties of helping on the victory of Democracy.

A great tract of purely Polish territory inhabited by 5,000,000 Poles enters into the formation of the Hapsburg monarchy, and these understand their duties towards the national ends of every Pole - the building up of the Polish Commonwealth - and that wider duty towards world democracy.

But it should be borne in mind, as the Polish National Defense Committee has already emphasized in its memorial of August 1917, that the strength of the Polish nation divided up among the Prussian and Austrian partitions, the Poles in the former Russian partition and the Polish military strength in the Russian army demand a union and a concentration around a single common gathering point. The creation of such a center of strength

also holds dependent on its existence the compromise between the political parties which Poland possesses as does indeed every modern nation.

In view of the fact that the concentration of Polish forces is to be utilized not only for the attainment of independence for Poland but also to hasten victory for the principles of Democracy, so closely connected with the cause of Poland, the point of attraction for these forces should be a State which is powerful enough to make its aid of material benefit and a State which stands above all suspicion of imperialism and tendency to oppose Liberty.

Public opinion in Poland indicated the United States of America as such a center. And especially the general disrepute in which secret and irresponsible diplomacy is held amongst Americans, - who cannot agree to a diplomacy which barter with whole nations as if these were property and not enlightened groups of free peoples, - has done much to distinguish the United States from among other powers.

In the memorial of the Polish National Defense Committee of August 1917, we asked for the realization of an endeavour to mobilize Polish resources against Prussian autocracy by sending out a diplomatic agent to Switzerland or Sweden, and there to come to an understanding with all the Polish parties in Poland. We emphasized then "with the Poles in Poland", as Polish emigrants cannot decide the fate of Poland; they do not possess any authorization to represent the general national interests, and such gentlemen as Mr. Dmowski in Paris or Mr. Paderewski here in America, represent at the best only a certain portion of the Catholic and Anti-Semitic reactionary element in Poland.

And now with the declaration of war on Austria in mind, we return to our matter, considering it is high time that this agent should be sent out immediately, together with Polish experts possessing proven democratic ideals.

We ask you, Sir, to endeavour to understand our motives. Every opinion and every plan we place before you is based on an exact and accurate knowledge of conditions in Central and Eastern Europe. We wrote, even before the outbreak of the war, that inevitable disaster awaits Russia. We were ridiculed when we wrote, also before the war commenced, that an independent Poland will be the keystone of the future structure of Europe. We aroused indignation when, immediately after the outbreak of the Russian revolution, we published in "Wici" (the official organ of the Polish National Defense Committee) a forecast of the further course of events in Russia, and which was later verified by actual occurrences down to the smallest details, in spite of the optimistic reports of Mr. Elihu Root. And now, seeing a future dark and threatening for Poland and for the Democracy of the whole world, we feel it our duty to warn patriotic Americans of the approaching danger.

All Central and Eastern Europe is worn out and exhausted beyond expression. The Polish, Serbian, Montenegrin, Roumanian, Lithuanian and White Russian nations are literally dying out through starvation. The burial of the dead has become a daily duty for every family. And especially the child mortality and degeneration caused by the unnatural mediums utilized to deceive the pangs of hunger, threaten the very existence of these nations. The depopulated territories will present an excellent

field for German colonization. The Germans are buying out Polish estates already.

The Polish nation, and with it the other nations which suffer under German oppression at present, have awaited in vain some assurance from the Allies that their unbearable sufferings will be rewarded by promises from the governments of the Entente Allies as to their independent existence. These assurances have not been given yet in spite of warning voices from the Polish nation. The words of President Wilson spoken on the 22nd of January of this year have found no response. Instead the secret documents revealed by the Bolsheviki demonstrate that smaller and oppressed nationalities were regarded as mediums of barter in the future clearing house of peace. The Russian Minister, Tere-szczenko, a few weeks before his downfall, expressed his doubt as to the possibility of an independent Poland in the presence of the Entente Ambassadors. The Ukrainian press is indignant at United States Ambassador Francis, who is said to have affirmed whilst at Petrograd that the claims of the Ukrainians to independence are as obsolete as those of the Redskins in America.

And really the greatest danger centers around the Ukraine at present. The Provisional Russian Government may have proclaimed the principle of national will, but in practice it has sinned more against this principle than the previous government, inasmuch as it created a precedent by dissolving the Finnish Diet with armed forces. The Bolsheviki did not fail to profit by this example and used this revolutionary method of dealing with its lawmakers, on Mr. Kierenski's government who had originally made use of this method on the Finns and incidentally turned them against Russia.

The same mistake was made towards the Ukraine; by denying it the right to autonomy, a complete breakaway from Russia was the result. The Germans, even before the war, foresaw the downfall of Russia and endeavoured to create a line of cleavage between the Poles and the Ukrainians so that the natural alliance of Poles and Ukrainians, so threatening to Germany, would be made impossible. The Germans were aided in this work by the Polish reactionaries under Dmowski, who, uniting with the Russian reactionaries, irritated the Ukrainians by refusing to recognize their right to nationality. In this the ground for the Ukrainian-German alliance was prepared, and this means that the Germans will be able to control the enormously rich agricultural lands, anthracite and iron-ore mines of the very best quality, as well as lands rich in phosphates, manganese and salt; the great fishing possibilities of the Black Sea should likewise be mentioned.

Thoughtless Russian publicists are still working to increase this distrust. Count Tolstoy is writing a series of articles in the Evening Mail at present in which he demonstrates to the Allies that the independence of Poland, Finland and the Ukraine, as also the other nationalities oppressed and subject to Russia, cannot be permitted, as all those having money invested in Russia would lose their capital. Such a standpoint as that taken up by this Russian "Democratic" Count with regard to oppressed nationalities, can but rouse the most profound indignation in the heart of every honest and just man, as the writer converts these nations into items in the Russian inventory, beads of burden, and on whom the Allies hold a mortgage as a result of the prodigality of the former Russian Government.

In this way President Wilson's doctrine loses all its

impetus and influence, although he still pictures and defines it excellently in all of his speeches, having realized that he is thus striking at the vital spot in the Prussian organism. The great doctrine was opposed and fought by the formation of a conspiracy of silence on the part of all the believers in the imperialistic faith throughout the whole world. The Prussian Government understood and appreciated the importance of this standpoint. It endeavours to create a semblance of maintaining these principles. It emphasizes in the organs of its press that so far the Central Powers have been the only nations to define their Polish policy, and further that they alone have rebuilt a Polish State on a certain portion of Polish land.

The Poles in Poland accept every German concession for the benefit of the Polish State; they render them permanent on the territory given up by the Germans and extend the branches of their public life, their authority and influences, but never cease to demand from the Germans the whole extent of Polish lands (Act of May 28, 1917, Cracow.) But the Germans are becoming increasingly less amenable to grant concessions and direct Polish attention to the lack of decisions in the matter of Poland on the part of the Allies. They point out the "doubt" expressed by Teraszczenko and to the secret agreements made by Russia regarding Poland.

The Germans have lately been given a new weapon of offense. The Allied Governments have recognized the Polish National Committee in Paris as an official Polish organization, and yet this Committee is composed of reactionaries hated in Poland - leaders of the Anti-Semites with Dmowski at their head, who not long ago were cooperating with the Czar in battling against de-

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mocracy.

And Mr. Lansing, writing to Mr. Paderewski, informs him that the Committee has been recognized by the Government with Mr. Paderewski as its representative in America.

This last act especially has caused great confusion of mind; and not only amongst Polish emigration in America. The Democratic portion of Polish emigration does not understand this act as we do, - that it was nothing more than lack of knowledge of Polish affairs, which permitted the recognition of this Committee; but they think instead that reaction is beginning to take the upper hand.

Dear Mr. Wilder! We write to you frankly, impelled by the fear that democracy is losing the benefit of this most important cooperation, directly against the desires of the President, the cooperation of the Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Serbians and Rumanians in the battle against Prussian autocracy, but that on the other hand exhaustion and starvation, the doubtful situation, a distrust of their best friends, will eventually force these nations into a compromise with the Germans. This course would be threatening to the future of democracy and to these nations themselves.

We turn to you therefore, knowing of your clear and idealistic views, your disinterestedness and fairness, with the request that you assist us and that we together consider the necessities of the situation.

According to us the need is as follows:

1. It is necessary again to raise the matter of sending out a Commission or an agent for Polish affairs to Europe, which would have for its object the union and consolidation of

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Polish parties in Poland under the leadership of the United States against the common enemy.

2. The support of the Western and Balkan States could be gained also by giving the Poles as well as the other oppressed nationalities the assurance of aid from the United States.

3. The plan of action should be arranged in accordance with the character of the forces and conditions attained after a common understanding and confirmation by the Government of the United States. Austria will have to count with such a powerful combination of Slav nationalities and follow the direction they indicate.

4. A new political commission should be sent out to Russia from America, with a numerous party of Poles to help the progressive Poles in Russia. Polish socialists have much influence in Russia and could help to organize the Russian front. Their presence in the American Commission would do much to build up again that faith in the United States which the Bolsheviki have destroyed and would reorganize Russia on the basis of the doctrines enunciated by President Wilson.

5. By the inclusion of Poles in the Russian Commission, it will be possible to obtain several hundred thousand Polish soldiers in the Russian army and use them to reinvigorate the military force of the Eastern front. The Polish soldiers have avoided so far all disorganization and demoralization, and compose the only good element in the Russian army, having avoided both Bolsheviki as well as Reactionary propaganda.

6. In this way a powerful force will be created, composed of all the Western and Balkan Slavs under the leadership of the United States of America. Further, the eastern front

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would be reorganized, the demoralized centralized Russian army being thrust aside by the decentralized Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian armies with high morale. These would strike at the Germans simultaneously with revolutionary risings on the part of the Polish and other Slav inhabitants in the territories occupied by the Germans; the Austrian government would retain a neutral attitude in all probability. A powerful, sustained and well prepared attack on the western front should accompany these movements.

The fulfillment of these plans quite naturally calls for long-sustained effort, but steps must be taken immediately to commence carrying them into effect.

We have expressed our thoughts although they are not popular ones at present. We consider however that new conditions demand new methods. That is why we so obstinately argue over this point, and it is our hope that you, Sir, appreciating our motives, will understand our thoughts.

Very sincerely yours,

Na oryginala podpisano:
B. Kusadawu -

Zgodnie z oryginalnem

B. Kusadawu -



*List p. W. Wilder or p. Sosnowski
Potwierdzenie odbioru
B. Kulakowski 2 dec 14 gm
1917*

WILDER, EWEN & PATTERSON

1667/55

45 Cedar Street,

New York.

December 18, 1917, WRW

Mr. G. J. Sosnowski,

59 Wall Street, City.

My dear Mr. Sosnowski:

The communication of Dr. Kulakowski to
me on behalf of the Polish National Defense Committee,
is the best statement of the present situation to date,
and I sent the original to Mr. Lansing with a letter,
copy of which I enclose, and which I wish you would send
to Dr. Kulakowski, Mr. Debski, et al, if you think it
will interest them.

In great haste,

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd.) Wm. R. Wilder.



*List of W. Wilder & Secretary How
J. Lansing's message, March
B. K. Sawar's 2 and 14 groups 1912-*

Deember 17, 1917.

W.

1667/35

Hon. Robert Lansing,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

VII

My dear Mr. Lansing:

Yours of the 10th inst. acknowledging receipt of the memorial of the Polish National Defense Committee, amend the advisability of the declaration of a state of war between this country and Austria, duly to hand and I am grateful to you.

At the time of its composition it was realized that such a declaration was inevitable, as indeed that fact was anticipated and practically admitted by the Committee.

Now that the 'Rubicon has been crossed' and this country further committed to active participation in the affairs of Europe, as well as in the preservation of our own liberties, it seems to me imperative that we strive, in cooperation with the Poles in this country, who are the most truly and clearly representative of their brethern in Europe, to a determination to realize on the "Polish Asset". Can it be done in any way other or better than suggested in the enclosed letter by the Committee, addressed to me, and which I take pleasure in transmitting to you for perusal and consideration?

I realize and deplore, as must you, the fact that there is not that unity and cohesion among the Poles in this country and that there should be in such a crisis. This is, however, one of the natural and inherent difficulties of the situation. The vast majority of the Poles, either in this country or in Central Europe do not and cannot belong to the same class of which Paderewski here, and Dmowski in Paris, are the representatives.

I have given this matter careful investigation and study, and am convinced that the Polish National Defense Committee undoubtedly represents the majority of the Poles both here and in Europe.

At all events, their views are well reasoned and entitled to respectful consideration. Up to the present time I have had some doubts about the wisdom of sending abroad a Polish Commission or a Polish Diplomatic Agent. Certainly it would have been and will be a grave mistake for such a Commission to proceed with any intention of trying to beat the German devil at his own game by any secret diplomacy.

The policy of this country towards weaker nations and peoples has, however, been so well defined by my Classmate, the President, that such Commission should openly proceed to deal with the Allied nations,- and if for no other purpose than by taking the lead and have such policy ratified and supported by the Allies.

I feel sure that this subject must be receiving careful attention by the President and your Department, but if the Polish National Defense Committee and myself can shed any further light, or be of any use, do not hesitate to command us both for the United States and for Poland.

Very faithfully yours,

W. R. W.



W-1-W

(Copy)

*potwierdzenie Sekretarza
Stanu z odhodu listu
z memorandem R. Kellogg
z dnia 14 grudnia
1917 oraz listu p. Wilder*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

VIII

1667/55

December 26, 1917.

Mr. William R. Wilder,
45 Cedar Street,
New York, N. Y.

S I R :

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of
December 17th, enclosing a letter to you from representa-
tives of the Polish National Defense Committee relative to
the proper attitude of the United States towards Poland.

The letter has been read with interest and the
suggestions contained therein are receiving the careful
consideration of the Department.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Robert Lansing.

860.c.01/57

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20 rozpraw z wygłoszeniami

W. S. A. C. W.



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IX

*Wycieczka przez Prezydenta,
K.O.V.*

1684/95

The following telegram was sent from President Wilson
to The Polish National Defense Committee:

"1918 Jan 14 PM 6 17

"THE WHITE HOUSE

Washington D. C. January 11th 3:45 P.M.

Doctor Joseph P. Zaleski President of the Polish National De-
fense Committee

Four six four nine South Ashland Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.

May I not express my heartfelt thanks and appreciation to
the Polish National Defense Committee for their gracious message
of January 9 and join with them in hoping that the New Year may
witness the realization of the long deferred hopes of the Polish
people.

Woodrow Wilson."

This telegram was an answer to a wire addressed to Presi-
dent Wilson from the Polish National Defense Committee which was
as follows:

"1918 Jan. 9.

Woodrow Wilson President of the United States of America
White House, Washington, D.C.

Mister President Polish National Defense Committee sends
you heartiest thanks and recognition for the definitive stand you
took toward Poland in your message the 8th January inst which we
take to be a fitting conclusion and signal of your message of
January 22nd 1917 you have founded the demands and desires of
Poland and of all the Poles when you said in the name of America
that peace may be concluded only when an independent Polish
State is erected consisting of all of the territories inhabited
by Poles including the Polish coast your solution of the Polish
question formation of strong Poland is the only guarantee of
the balance of power in eastern Europe the only guarantee of
lasting peace Doctor Joseph Zaleski, President, J. M. Sienkie-
wicz Vice President, Doctor K. A. Zurawski, Vice President,
Stanislaw Rayzacher, Secretary, Thomas Siemiradzki, Treasurer,
M. Sikolowski, Director.

*Za zgodności z oryginałem
B. Kutnowski*

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X

List p. W. Wilder of Mr. Corwin
Ktng in postcard informag; copy
my Smulski's recent promission
i balance of Oct 1918 K.O.V. of
ubi spang dyplan of cures with
Amey or Polm. — March 7, 1918.

1667/85

Mr. Cyrus H. McCormick,
605 South Michigan Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois.

My dear Cyrus:

Yours of the 20th ult. with Mr. Steuert's report of
the 19th ult. duly to hand, and I appreciate your position.

We are both anxious to help the Poles in every pos-
sible way. It is a difficult matter with both the Poles and
their friends working in absolute harmony, and doubly diffi-
cult if we and they have to work against "cross-currents".

My knowledge of men is derived from personal con-
tact, their history and surroundings, what they have done,
said, written and stand for, and these tests I applied to the
five gentlemen of whom I wrote you, and all of whom I have
known for a year or so; with some I have been in daily con-
tact.

I am again enclosing copy of their curricula vitae,
the mere perusal of which is enough to satisfy anyone that
they cannot possibly "represent the extremely radical element",
and at the same time be true. The only radical member of the
group is Alexander Debski, of whom no criticism is made and who
is a national - not international - socialist and a man of the
Gompers type. Dr. Stanley Stanislaus and Dr. E. H. Lewinski
Corwin are beyond criticism, being as conservative as you and
myself, and I am sure that Mr. Smulski could not have had them

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in mind, as composing any part of an "extremely radical element".

The specific criticisms in Mr. Steuert's report are directed against Dr. Kulakowski and General Sosnowski. As to the former, I heartily agree with Mr. Smulski that "he is an able man". He writes better than he talks, and in that respect resembles Oliver Goldsmith. He is not a "radical socialist and an I. W. W. sympathizer", if one can judge from his conversation and his writings. I have met him frequently, and have read much of what he has written. He assures me that he never has written or spoken a word in favor of the I. W. W., is absolutely opposed to it and all its works, and that his socialistic views are of the most conservative character. He is editor of the paper "Wici" the organ of the Polish National Defense Committee and not of the Chicago paper "Dziennik Ludowy". To this latter paper he has contributed at times, and for some ten days or two weeks in *Summer* 1903 he acted as editor during the absence of the editor and owner. I understand that this paper has not regarded the Harvester Trust favorably, but Dr. Kulakowski assures me that he never has written, said or published anything for or against the "Harvester interests". Now, what are we going to do about it? Who must be mistaken?

*who is it that
Har. Tr. for
Dr. Kulakowski*

Mr. Smulski states that Mr. Steuert that he "is on friendly terms with all these gentlemen", etc. This I am inclined to doubt because Dr. Kulakowski in June, 1915, made an attack on Banker Smulski for charging a higher rate than was prevalent for the transmission of funds for the relief of those suffering in Poland, and I am advised that it resulted in

his repaying the sum of \$200 to the fund. I merely mention this as a possible reason for Mr. Smulski's misstatements.

As to General Sosnowski, I wish you would read over the annexed sketch in regard to him. He did come to this country in 1893 and though he was connected with the Polish Commission to the World's Fair, responsibility for the Polish pictures rested on the other members of the Commission. As it was not possible to sell them he was sent over the following year to secure if possible the return of one "Vernihora" to Poland as it had an historical, if not artistic value. This he succeeded in doing, and I believe the rest were sold in this city at a loss, but Mr. Sosnowski had nothing whatever to do with their sale, and as far as I can ascertain there was no "responsibility" imposed upon him except as to the one picture, and that not until a year after the close of the Chicago Fair.

Mr. Smulski I am advised, ought to be well informed on this matter for he was financially and actively helping the Polish Commission all the time of the duration of the Chicago Fair.

As to Sosnowski's connection with the Red Cross work, I am advised that he was entrusted with the administrative end thereof, and had absolutely nothing whatever to do with the collection or the disbursements of any funds. He was not aware "that Mr. Smulski had gotten about \$20,000 in Chicago", but was under the impression that it was about \$10,000 as that was the only amount, as he was advised, that reached Poland. None of it was "sent to Mr. Sosnowski", but all funds were handled and



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disbursed (though under Mr. Sosbowski's orders) by the American Consul, Fernando de Soto, and Vice Consul Fuchs. It would also appear that Mr. Smulski is mistaken in supposing that Mr. Sosnowski "took all the credit to himself, and as a result got himself appointed as a General". Mr. Sosnowski seems to be under the impression that his promotion in the Red Cross of the Russian Army was due to meritorious services. He was wounded three times, was presented with and declined the Crosses of St. George and St. Vladimir on the ground that he was fighting for Poland and not for Russia. This, while patriotic, was what Mr. Smulski would probably call, and very justly - "erratic". In due course of time he was commissioned by the Russian Government to come to this country to supervise and report on all the war orders placed by Russian Government in the United States. Before leaving he wished to know and was informed that a truthful report was desired. He made such reports, and the result expected by him happened, to wit: "he was relieved of his duties" - and in this respect Mr. Smulski is right.

There is no disposition on the part of these gentlemen, and there will be none so long as I have anything to do with them, "to build up a rival Committee". Their only desire is to serve this country and Poland. They possess exceptional knowledge and ability. How representative they are of the Poles in this country it is difficult to state, because the table of membership in associations of this kind is so elastic. The table given by Mr. Steuert is, I presume, an approximation or guess. The Polish National Defense Committee does not consider any one

a member who is not actually enrolled, hence the small estimate made by Mr. Smulski.

I am sure that both you and Mr. Smulski misconceive the object of these gentlemen. It is not to "build up a rival committee", but to create a "Polish Information Bureau" for the benefit primarily of the State Department. Three of these five gentlemen are in close and constant touch with the situation in Poland and Russia, and I am positive possess sources of accurate information superior to those possessed by any of the other organizations. The other organizations are more or less mixed up with American politics and religion; in fact, Mr. Smulski's unwarranted suspicion of the motives of these gentlemen is undoubtedly due to the fact that in the late campaign they, as ardent, almost idolatrous worshippers of Wilson, voted and worked for the Democratic party and thereby came in conflict with Mr. Smulski's local and American political ambitions. They advocated working in the utmost harmony with all the Polish organizations, and in utilizing to the utmost Mr. Smulski and Mr. Paderewski for the common cause. We appreciate, as Mr. Smulski must be fair enough himself to appreciate, the disadvantage that he labors under on account of his interest in American party politics, but that is no reason why his help should not be sought by any one interested in the cause of Poland.

So also in regard to Mr. Paderewski. We all concede that he is the best Polish asset in this country for the purpose of raising funds and creating emotional enthusiasm. It is not necessary, in fact it does more harm than good, to insist that

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
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Mr. Paderewski is an "able statesman", or should be made President or King of Poland. Statesmen are not created as was Minerva, and the question of King or President for Poland can well be postponed for a season. If Mr. Smulski is as good and broad-guaged a man as you think, let him see me when next he is in New York. Possibly I can do the cause of Poland no greater good than to eliminate or iron out all petty feelings and jealousies and have all work in unison and harmony. There never will be "a free and united Poland" unless there be unity and harmony in the effort to secure the freedom.

While I have not shown your letters and have treated the subject matter as confidentially as possible, yet I have had to make some inquiry of these gentlemen in regard to certain facts, I have not the slightest objection to your showing this letter to Mr. Smulski, or any one else. This is the time to iron out differences and get together.

Very faithfully yours,

26 25000000 2 original
Skuta nowa —



Ob. B. Kusavowski 20.10.1915 demuncjowany
przez obywateli polski i wloski amerykanscy
jako szpieg ukraiński. - Rząd am. odmówił
też jego przyjęcia. Za jego jedyną wprawę
na polu polityki.

REPLIES MADE BY BRONISLAW D. KULAKOWSKI TO QUESTIONS ASKED HIM

-by-

CAPTAIN A. S. DALRYMPLE.

---000---

Question 1: It is reported that while the K.O.N. has dropped its opposition to recruiting in the Polish Army, their speakers are urging Poles to enlist in the Slavic Legions rather than in the Polish Army, although by the express terms of the law relating to the Slavic Legions the Poles are not to be permitted to enlist therein. Is this correct? If not, are you prepared to discipline any member of the K.O.N. who speaks along these lines?

Answer: The speakers from the K.O.N. could not possibly without running the risk of exposing themselves to ridicule urge the joining of the Slav Legion, which is not in existence at all. The entire campaign as conducted by the opponents of the K.O.N. is based upon such false denunciations. For this reason, and for the sake as well of public peace, we request that copies of these reports be given to us and that those making such denunciations be called upon to repeat their charges openly. We are powerless against secret and cowardly informers. We are, however, prepared, and what is more we insist upon our privilege, to avail ourselves of an open and just trial before American courts of justice. We want light and we are fighting against darkness.

In re Senator Hitchcock's Bill we expressed our opinion and we supported Senator Hitchcock's plan, since we have ourselves demanded the very same thing, as may be plainly seen from our letter addressed to Lieutenant Brazol, representative of the Union of Russian Citizens. When however, on account of Mr. Paderewski's interference in the matter, the Poles were omitted from said Bill, and there was thus the possibility of interpreting the Bill in the sense that Poles would not be admitted to service in said Legion, we submitted to President Wilson our opinions on the matter at issue.

I beg however to call attention to the fact that the Bill in question fails to contain even a word that the "Poles are not permitted to enlist therein". The Poles are only omitted from the list of Slavs who were called upon to enter this Legion.

Generally speaking, the cause of said Legion has, as far as we know, not assumed any more tangible shape than that of a plan. In this respect we beg to call attention to an ar-

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ticle published in The New York Times, issue of September 22, 1918, under the caption "Use the Slavic Legion". In this article we find the following paragraphs:

"So far as can be learned there is at this moment no Slavic legion

"Poles and Czecho-Slovaks living in America and not yet American citizens can join and are joining the legions maintained by those nations under the French flag. It may be said it is immaterial under what flag they fight, but one thing is material to many volunteers: the compensation paid to the American private is twenty times as great as that paid to the French private, and families of men serving in the American army are more certain to be looked after in this country than those whose breadwinners have joined other national armies and are therefore not on the lists which guide relief organizations in their care for the welfare of those at home. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that many thousands of men who could and would serve in our army cannot subject their families to the hardships entailed by going into the French Legions."

This is the opinion expressed by a paper which was steadily supporting the Legions recruited in this country by Mr. Paderewski. And that the families of those who went to France because urged by Mr. Paderewski are not being cared for at all is best proven by Mr. Paderewski's own speech delivered at the Convention of the Polish Immigrants at Detroit in August 1918. In this speech Mr. Paderewski said as follows:

"Those who are falling and dying for Poland's freedom deserve not only honor and gratitude. Honor and gratitude are but mere words which cost nothing. Our knights are entitled to our solicitude, our cordial and permanent care, our assistance and our gratitude right along.

"The Polish National Committee bethought itself of this and entrusted the care for our soldiers in France to most competent man for that kind of work; to a man nearest to these soldiers, to Dr. Fronczak. (Applause) To the same Dr. Fronczak, who from the very first day of the war was at the front and was possibly the first man wounded.

"The same idea occurred to us here and we too appealed right away to the American Red Cross asking for help and assistance. The American Red Cross, this most noble philanthropic organization in the world, is assisting all the nations and all similar institutions but it does not establish itself any separate national departments confining itself only to assisting those who were already in existence.

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"As every national army has its own sanitary department, called the Red Cross, we arrived therefore to the conclusion that the Polish Army too needed such a supplement and such a unit. We requested the American Red Cross, which is in this respect the supreme authority, to give us the permission to organize our own Polish Red Cross for obvious and very plain reasons. The American Red Cross was unable to give us this permission.

"In several instances and owing to individuals to whom I hereby beg to express my most heartfelt gratitude, there were sent various articles to our soldiers in both camps. But there is no question in this connection of any individual subsidies and gifts, there is no question of any sporadic assistance no matter how munificent. The question is of a steady, full and organized assistance such as our wounded are entitled to from us. Our boys have already been fighting, are fighting now, and there is reported some 300 of them wounded and sick.

"What could we have done? Should we have left them at the mercy of the French Red Cross? This organization too is exhausted by now. France is expending only three francs per diem for the maintenance of her wounded, per head. A proof of this contention consists of the fact that the American Red Cross has already at one time granted to France a subsidy to a small amount of \$32,000,000. We cannot therefore count upon France in this respect as even the soldiers themselves are complaining as we have proofs in our hands, of the lack of this assistance.

"What were we to do? Postpone thus indefinitely the entire issue of assistance? Should we have left our Polish soldiers without Polish nurses, without Polish surgeons, without any help, without any assistance? Such an indifference, such a negligence would be a downright scandal and a crime on the part of the immigrants.

"There has therefore been organized the Polish White Cross. One moment please! (A group of White Cross Nurses of uniform ascends the platform amidst enthusiastic greetings and unending applause of the audience.)

"Even if the work in behalf of this organization is the share of some one very near and dear to me and of other well known people as well, still the idea of the White Cross is mine and for this idea I assume the full responsibility before God and you, with an absolutely clear conscience. (Applause) "

How much of an assistance was given by Mr. Paderewski's White Cross to those "our knights, who are entitled to

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our solicitude, our cordial and permanent care, our assistance and our gratitude right along", if we may be permitted to quote Mr. Paderewski's own words? According to the statement, submitted to the Detroit Convention the entire assets of the White Cross amount to but the sum of \$10,000 -- in plain words, ten thousand dollars.

While the noble-hearted Young Women's Christian Association expressed through Mrs. Turczynowicz its willingness to come to the assistance of those Polish soldiers, whose welfare Mr. Paderewski treated so negligently, the very same people who founded the White Cross cautioned in their circular letters of the nurses of another "religious denomination" than the soldiers and called the work done by Mrs. Turczynowicz a "poison served in a golden cup".

I am addressing myself to you, Captain, as to a soldier and an American, with the question whether or not the simple feeling of humanity and the principle of saying the truth -- a principle resting upon all of us -- should not compel us to take into serious consideration the query whether it was permissible for us to urge immigrants, who are working hard and are in many cases burdened with large families, to enter an army that is being directly so indolently by artists playing statesmen, while simultaneously other Slavic peoples are being permitted to avail themselves of the privilege of entering the American army, of benefitting by a large compensation, by the American Red Cross, by the Young Men's and the Young Women's Christian Associations, by the Salvation Army and by the war insurance of the American soldiers, - that unique institution in the world?

I beg to state to you quite plainly that I would at any time rather be imprisoned for many years than stand in a relation of that kind to my fellow countrymen.

Because of our criticism of the actions of irresponsible and ambitious individuals, and because of our championing the democratic principles and defending Polish immigrants against reactionary statesmen, we were presented to the American Government as Pro-Germans, as obstructionists, and almost as incendiaries and murderers. We patiently stood this injustice being aware of the fact that the American Government, confronted with gigantic problems, was unable to look into all the details. Confusion of ideas and chaos in the minds of the Poles is growing from day to day, particularly after the abortive Convention at Detroit. We are being pointed at as originators of this condition. At this time it will have an effect upon us.

The Poles are unable to understand why the Czechs, who have an army of their own, why the Russians, who also have their own armies, why the Yugo-Slavs should have the right to enter the ranks of the American Army, benefit by all the prerogatives given to American soldiers and be sure that in case of their death their families will be cared for, while we Poles

who are under a special obligation of gratitude to America and to her President for the great act of January 22, 1917, should be deprived of the right to enter the ranks of the American army and be compelled to enter the ranks of the Polish Legions in France improvised by an emotional artist.

The present war is compelling all the warring parties to a constant criticism of their measures. Owing to this criticism and owing to constant improvements, victory is already assured. Many of the measures taken in former times and many of the opinions entertained previously have had to be revised. Could not in the same way the question of the exclusion of the Poles from the Slav Legion be revised?

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Question 2. At the last convention of the K.O.N. held at Philadelphia in May, 1918, a resolution was adopted recognizing the Polish Regency Council established by Germany as the "supreme national authority". Is this still the position of the K.O.N.? If not, when and by what method was this resolution rescinded? If this resolution remains unrescinded, does it represent the attitude of the K.O.N.? If not, are you willing to take all steps in your power to have it rescinded? If you are not willing to have it rescinded, does it represent your present attitude towards the Regency Council? If so, are you in favor of the United States formally recognizing the Regency Council?

Answer: Enclosed I beg to submit the original text of the resolution as passed by the Convention of the Polish National Defense Committee in Philadelphia, Pa. on May 3, 1918. In this resolution you will find the following passage:

"We express the highest respect for the Regency of the Kingdom of Poland, the sole present authority, for its dignified protest and its struggle in counteracting German aggression against the political independence of Poland, or attempts to form so-called Polish Governments abroad, without the authorization of the Polish nation."

As citizens or temporary residents of America we could but express our respects for the Regency. On my last visit to you, Captain, I submitted a translation of the manifesto issued by the Council of Regency on the occasion of the Peace Treaty of Brzesc Litewski. In the said manifesto the Council of Regency branded in sharp words the perfidy on the part of the two Emperors, and stated quite plainly that these two Emperors have cheated the Polish nation. It is hard to go any further than did the Council of Regency. It is impossible to demand from Archbishops and

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aristocrats that they should bring about a revolution or throw bombs.

We styled the Council of Regency an "authority". Any one who is familiar with the principles of the political law must agree to grant this character to an executive, in the name of which there are being issued in Poland sentences passed by the courts of justice through Judges appointed by that Council of Regency, which also establishes schools, appoints teachers, convenes the Council of State, &c. All classes of the Polish nation in Poland have recognized this Council of Regency as the supreme national authority, with the exception of the Radicals who constitute an opposition to the Council of Regency.

The Polish National Defense Committee is fully in accord with the principles professed by the parties opposing the Council of Regency. But neither the opposition on the part of the socialists and radicals against the Council of Regency nor the siding of the Polish National Defense Committee with this opposition can alter the fact of the existence of this Council of Regency as an authority, limited, to be sure, by the German authorities of occupation, but nevertheless of an authority which is carrying on a struggle against the Germans by means of expedients which are commensurate with the social and financial situation of the Regents themselves.

We have added purposely the qualifications "sole, present", to the term "authority". We are confident that the immensely difficult evolution of the Polish state, under directly terrible conditions will not stop at the present form of government, and that the end of the war will see in the place of the conservative Regents of a Kingdom of Poland, the venerable figure of a President of the Republic of Poland. If however this Council of Regency had not been wrung from the Germans, there would have been in Warsaw a German governor-general, just as there was a Russian governor-general prior to the war, and German schools would have replaced the Russian schools of Warsaw. What Pole, what liberty-loving individual could fail to agree that Polish courts of justice, Polish schools and a Polish Government, though limited, constitute a progress and a step forward towards completed freedom and independence? Besides Mr. Paderewski, and Mr. Dmowski as well, expressed at the Convention at Detroit their greatest respect for the Council of Regency. They only reserved for themselves and for their political friends the exclusive right of conducting Poland's foreign policies. For this, however, they lack the authorization of Poland. Such an authorization could ensue only under certain conditions. Even a Polish government might be organized outside of Polish territory. We established this principle quite plainly in our resolution. This authorization, however, must be properly authenticated and verified. Mere verbal assertions, particularly assertions made by Mr. Dmowski, require a corroboration before the Committee of Paris could be

recognized as a Ministry of War and of State.

As far however as the recognition of the Council of Regency of Poland by the United States Government is concerned, I beg to express the following opinion:

I am decidedly opposed to the recognition of the Council of Regency as a Government of Poland on the territory, now recognized by the Germans as the Polish State, that is within the boundaries of former Russian Poland and not complete at that. Such a recognition would be politically aimless and even prejudicial, since it would hardly cause any embarrassment to the Germans and would on the other hand make the impression on the Poles that the United States intended to accord to Poland the same boundaries as were granted Poland by the Germans.

On the other hand, however, the recognition by the United States and by the Allies of the Council of Regency as the legitimate government of Poland -- the latter within the boundaries as they existed in the times of the Commonwealth of Poland prior to the partitions and including also both Silesias and Prussian Masuria, would have immense results. In that case, the Council of Regency, notwithstanding the opportunistic and cautious disposition on the parts of its members, could not possibly reject an authority offered in such a way. In case the Council of Regency actually rejected such a proposition, the Poles would not tolerate them for even one day in the royal palace at Warsaw. The Council of Regency would then be compelled to accept the proposition and to enter thus into a life and death conflict with the Germans. Great enthusiasm would spread all over Poland. But in order that this enthusiasm might become a constructive factor in the dynamics of the war, Poland needs to be prepared for such a step and the supply of arms and ammunition must be secured. In order, however, to prepare Poland for such an action, there should be established a direct contact with Poland by means of an appropriate American Commission and an Allied Commission as well.

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Question 3. Are you and your associates willing to actively urge recruiting in the Polish Army through the medium of the press, public speakers and public meetings?

Answer: We could not possibly support the Polish Army in its present form, with its present legal and political character and with its present management in America, carried on negligently and indolently by amateurs who never served in any army at all. We did all that was consistent with our ob-

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ligation of obedience to the United States Government and we discontinued to oppose said Polish army privately and publicly as well. At the present time I am reviving this question at your own request, and am expressing my personal opinion and attitude on this matter. I am however in the position to declare categorically that the Polish National Defense Committee will not only not oppose but on the contrary will support to the very limit of its possibilities the recruiting for Polish troops and the dispatching of these troops to the Western and the Eastern fronts as well, as soon as there shall be eliminated certain improprieties which caused the result that after a propaganda of a year's duration Mr. Paderewski was able to recruit for his army but 20,000 men, as has been stated by Mr. Dmowski at the Convention in Detroit.

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Question 4: Do you still contend that the presence of the Polish Army on the Western Front is inimical to the best interests of Poland?

Question 5: Do you contend that the majority of Poles in Poland are opposed to the presence of the Polish Army on the Western Front as one of the Allies? If so, give us the facts on which you base this opinion.

Answer: The larger the number of soldiers on the side of America and of the Allies the speedier and more final will be the victory of democracy over autocratic rule. For this very reason we at no time claimed and we do not claim now that the presence of Polish soldiers on the Western Front was prejudicial to Poland's interests. All we claim is that the very source from which the idea of forming a Polish army originated and the present management of that army, or better, say the individuals who are trying to use this army for their own political or rather party ends, were facts which were influencing badly the enthusiasm for the army in question and were causing a complete lack of support of that army on the part of the democratic elements among the Poles. Polish democracy was at all times and still is deadly hostile to Prussianism. But this Polish democracy cannot on the other hand subscribe to the imposing upon the good faith of America and of the Allies, imposing resulting from making America and the Allies believe that the entire Polish nation was standing back of the present leaders and promoters of this army. On the contrary: the Polish Legions in France would at once meet with the support of the entire Polish nation, the very moment that the control over this army by men, still devoted to the Czar, was eliminated. It will be sufficient to quote in this connection the proclamation as issued by the Polish Democratic Union in France to be able to appreciate this statement's veracity. We read in this proclamation as

follows:

"Recognizing the fact that on the weakening of Germany depends not only the fate of Poland but also that of France, so dear to us, all of us here almost without exception, would stand by the armed Polish force now forming, if

1. This Polish force were not originated by the Russian Ochrana (Ignatieff II) by Messrs. Mokiejewski, former official of the Russian embassy, Gasiorowski and Piltz, who is generally despised;

2. If the Government of France was not mislead by promises of getting at least 100,000 Poles from America and was not to this very day assured that those who have arrived thus far formed but a small vanguard of the great army which is preparing to depart (Gasiorowski's statement in the "Excelsior"), and if

3. It were not announced that not the term "the Polish national army", which only the Polish Government has the right to create, but the name of either "Polish Legion" or "Polish Corps" was to be used instead.

In view of this, the overwhelming majority of the Polish colony in France was compelled to withdraw from participating in that undertaking based on lies and therefore doomed to bankruptcy which might hurt the good name of the Poles."

The above declaration was made by the Union of the Polish Democrats in France. This body has, just as is the case in America, the backing of the best intellects of Poland. The Polish democrats in France constitute the flower of the Polish nation. Among the founders and leaders of this Union belong individuals like the following: Mrs. Curie-Sklodowska the world famous discoverer of the radium and the first woman to reach in France the highest scientific honors, Dr. Motz, one of the best known Paris physicians, Dr. H. Gierszynski, a veteran of the Revolution of 1863 and a man known and respected throughout Europe, the well-known French engineer Mr. Lipkowski. All these people are French citizens and are, according to Mr. Dmowski's statement (See Dmowski's memorial in the "Wici", issue No. 63, 1917) those "franc-tireurs so-called by some representatives of the French Government, and have the greatest influence here, have access everywhere and possess a good opinion". These words, uttered by Mr. Dmowski, bespeak the bitterness of a man who jointly with his friend Piltz gained by their activities nothing but "bad opinion" all over Poland.

I beg to call your attention, Captain, to the fact that the Union of the Polish Democrats in France has not met with any persecution on the part of the French Government because of their so pronounced attitude taken against that army

that was formed in their own adopted country. The Intelligence Department may easily obtain from the French Government all the necessary information concerning said Union and the respective attitudes taken on the matter at issue by Mme. Curie-Sklodowska and Messrs. Motz, Lipkowski and others, and their standing in the eyes of the public opinion in France and of the French Government.

The same attitude was taken by the Convention of the Polish Democrats in Petrograd and Moscow. The same attitude was also taken by the entire democracy of Poland. This attitude may be defined by the following formula:

The sovereign rights of a nation belong everywhere to the nation as a whole and not to a portion of that nation, regardless of the fact as to what the character of any portion of that nation might be. The nation delegates its sovereign rights and prerogatives to representatives of its executive authority, delegates elected by the nation itself. To the foremost prerogatives of a nation belong the army and the use of that army.

The Polish army in France which was nothing but a political part of the Russian Embassy in France, has no right to the appellation of a Polish army nor any right to a Polish flag, both attributes belonging exclusively to the nation. All Poles are however in favor of increasing the force of the Anti-German coalition in order to secure an absolute victory over Germany and Austria.

FOR THIS REASON THE POLES ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE FORMATION OF VOLUNTEER DETACHMENTS OF POLES UNDER THE FLAG OF EITHER AMERICA OR FRANCE, OR GREAT BRITAIN OR ITALY, AND UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS THE FOREIGN LEGION OF FRANCE. THUS THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NATION WOULD NOT BE INFRINGED UPON AND THE POLES WOULD AT THE SAME TIME HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF PARTICIPATING, WITHOUT VIOLATING THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF THE POLISH NATION, TO THE FORMATION OF AN ARMY OF ITS OWN, IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PRUSSIAN MILITARY AUTOCRACY.

An example to the Poles might be in this connection the AMERICAN VOLUNTEERS, WHO PARTICIPATED SO NUMEROUSLY AND NOBLY IN THE WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE ALLIES PRIOR TO AMERICA ENTERING THE WAR. THESE VOLUNTEERS DID NOT FORM ANY AMERICAN ARMY UNDER THE STAR SPANGLED BANNER, BUT THEY DID NOT HESITATE TO SERVE UNDER THE FLAGS OF FRANCE OR OF CANADA. THESE VOLUNTEERS SHOWED THE GREATEST POSSIBLE RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THEIR NATION, AND AT THE SAME TIME THEY FOUGHT IN THE DEFENSE OF CIVILIZATION. WHY SHOULD THE POLES HAVE AN INFERIOR CONCEPTION THAN THE AMERICANS OF THE RIGHTS OF THEIR NATION?

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Question 6: Are you and your associates willing to actively urge the passage of a resolution by the proper authorities of the K.O.N. declaring your support of the Polish National Committee in Paris, which has been officially recognized by the Allies and our State Department? Do you dispute the authority of the Polish National Committee to speak for the Polish Nation?

Answer: I dispute the authority of the Polish National Committee in Paris, for the following reasons:

1. The Committee in Paris originated as a continuation of the National Committee of Petrograd, which consisted of a group of men, belonging for the most part to the reactionary, national democratic party. THESE MEN WERE NOT ASPIRING AT ALL TO AN INDEPENDENT POLAND, as is best proven by their telegram addressed to Grand Duke Nicholas Nicholajovitsch, on August 15, 1914, in which telegram these men demanded that Poland be united under the "SCEPTRE OF HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, NICHOLAS II", AND IN WHICH THEY REQUESTED THAT "THEIR LOYAL SENTIMENTS AS SUBJECTS BE SUBMITTED AT THE STEPS OF THE THRONE OF HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY AND SOVEREIGN LORD". From among the members of the present Committee of Paris, this telegram so DEVOID OF ANY HUMAN AND NATIONAL DIGNITY, was signed by ROMAN DMOWSKI, KOZICKI AND MAURICE ZAMOY-SKI. Thus these gentlemen destroyed the tradition of Poland's struggles for independence and ELIMINATED THEMSELVES ENTIRELY FROM ALL AND ANY PATRIOTIC LIFE.

2. These gentlemen at that time DID NOT DEMAND ANY FORMATION OF A POLISH ARMY. They limited themselves to the attempt of forming a Polish Legion on the side of Russia. They met with HATRED AND CONTEMPT ON THE PART OF THE ENTIRE POLISH PEOPLE, who saw in their pro-czarist policy an ABDICATION ON THE PART OF THE POLISH NATION FROM THE LATTER'S RIGHT TO INDEPENDENCE. The name of Mr. Roman Dmowski became the object of hatred among the true democrats of Poland.

3. Mr. Dmowski's debut on the arena of international politics took place in London, where at an official dinner in the Russian Embassy, the Czar's Ambassador, Benckendorff, introduced Mr. Dmowski to the British statesman as a Russian statesman. Hence the British press wrote about Mr. Dmowski's lectures at Cambridge as of lectures delivered by a "Russian".

3. The National Committee of Paris was organized mainly as stated by Mr. Dmowski himself in his memorial addressed to the Inter-Party Club (See "Wici", 1917, page 1084, of the collection of the issues of that publication for the year in question), "In order to nullify the harmful work of certain Poles, who have the greatest influence in France". THOSE CRIMINALS FOR THE RUNNING DOWN OF WHOM IT WAS NECESSARY TO FORM A "MINISTRY OF WAR AND OF STATE", WERE: Mrs. Curie-Sklodowska, Messrs. Motz, Gierszynski and Lipkowski. These people were dangerous for the reactionaries of Dmowski's type as some of these dangerous people were for a long time in intimate relations with the leader of the French democracy and now prime-minister of France, Mr. George Clemenceau.

5. This Committee has no right to represent the Polish nation as the Polish nation did not appoint said Committee, but on the contrary almost everywhere denied to the latter confidence and respect. The very fact that one of the members of this Committee, Mr. Brasm Piltz, is a man who was blackballed as a candidate for membership in the Association of Polish Journalists in Warsaw, is sufficient proof that the Polish nation cannot possibly give its sanction to a Committee, among the members of which is a man whose name was mentioned by Burcew in the list of the members of the Cz arist Ochrans. I beg to enclose a memorial of the same man, Piltz, addressed to the Russian Ochrana and an issue of the "Wici" with passages translated into English, from which material you may see as to the political opinions entertained by this alleged co-incumbent of the portfolio of a Polish Minister of War and of State.

6. Although Mr. Dmowski claims that he has the backing of the entire Polish nation, this claim is absolutely unsupported by any act or document. Last year he lost the remainder of his adherents by the secession of the gentry of Lithuania under the leadership of Meysztowicz and of the Polish gentry of Ruthenia under the leadership of Pulaski, a descendant of the American Revolutionary General of that name. He has not got the backing of any one but the remainder of the politically bankrupt national democratic party. The very conception of the ministry of war and of state that is not recognized by the nation nor appointed by the national executive authority and having among its members the most esteemed Mr. Fronczak of Buffalo, a Major in the American army, constitutes the acme of ignorance in matters of legal and political nature. The ministry of war and state and therefore a portion of the executive authority of the state which holds in its hands the most important prerogatives of national sovereignty, has therefore among its members a citizen of a foreign country!

Think for yourself, Captain, what the Americans would say in case some one tried to ridicule America by claiming that a Pole, Mr. Paderewski, was a member of the American cabinet! How could anybody treat so contemptuously the conceptions of the Americans as to the sovereign rights of America and as to the National representation. Why should we therefore be compelled to treat the political rights of Poland in a burlesque-like way?

7. The Cubans and even the Philipinos had their own Yuntas and ministries of war and state outside of the territory of their respective countries. BUT THEY WERE BACKED BY THE CONSENT OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONS. In Poland, however, there is no sanction of this National Committee of Paris; on the contrary there is a distinct HOSTILITY AGAINST THE LATTER.

8. For the above reasons the Polish National Defense Committee rejected two seats in the Paris Committee that were offered to the Polish National Defense Committee by the representative of the Franco-Polish Military Mission in America, Mr. Gasiorowski. For this reason too Mr. Sosnowski, who while not a mem-

ber of the Polish National Defense Committee, is however cooperating with us in many matters, rejected a seat in this Committee when offered one by Mr. Paderewski. Fighting against Prussian autocracy we could not possibly at the same time support the self-appointed Polish autocracy. It was for this very same reason that the Allies did not recognize the authority of General Horvath in Siberia, although this General accomplished from the military point of view more for the cause of the Allies than could ever possibly be accomplished by an entire army composed of nothing but Dmowskis and Paderewskis. The Allies were perfectly justified in avoiding the possibility of an objection on the part of the Russians that they were supporting a government that originated in an undemocratic way. Why therefore should an exception be made for Poland, and why should the latter be compelled to recognize self-appointed rulers of the Dmowski type?

9. The American Government recognized the Czecho-Slovak Committee and by doing so acted justly and wisely. THIS COMMITTEE WAS ALL THE TIME IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE CZECHS IN BOHEMIA. The Czechs in Bohemia and abroad acted in accord with one and the same idea and a UNIFORM PLAN. This is proven by facts. At a signal given from a central authority manifestations began in Bohemia against the Austrian authorities, the bishops in Bohemia recognized the independence of Bohemia, Czech troops in Russia attacked the Bolsheviki while at the same time Mr. Masaryk appeared in America and secured the recognition on the part of America and of the Allies for the Czecho-Slovaks.

What did Mr. Dmowski do? BY his party politics, by his relations with the Russian reactionary party he destroyed the possibility of forming in Russia an immense Polish Legion of 700,000 men, produced a split among the Polish immigrants in America, by throwing at the democratic elements among these immigrants the hideous suspicion of pro-germanism, and subjected the Poles in America to the absolute domination of the Catholic clergy through the Convention at Detroit, thus switching the centre of gravity of the Polish cause beyond the territory of America through the resolution of said convention which recognized the National Committee of Paris. Now he endeavors by all possible means to bring about a complete break between Poland and the Allies by presenting constantly all Poles as pro-Germans. What is really the object of this policy so ill-boding to the Allies and to America as well?

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Question 7. Is it not a fact that the majority of Poles in Poland are in accord with the policies of the Polish National Committee? If your answer is "No" to the foregoing question, state the facts on which you base your conclusions to the contrary.

Answer: The Polish National Defense Committee endeavored repeatedly to bring about an understanding. A proof thereof

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consists of various documents which are attached to the present, to wit:

A. Terms of an agreement suggested by the Polish National Defense Committee and rejected by MR. Paderewski on October 12, 1917. Detailed information on this subject may be obtained from the then representative of the National Committee and of Dr. F. I. Drobinski, residing at 697 Fourth Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y., (telephone South 2115), who recognized the correctness of the conditions as set forth by us, but Messrs. Paderewski and Smulski prevented any understanding to be reached.

B. The letter of the Polish National Defense Committee addressed to the representative of the Union of Russian Citizens and the letter addressed by this representative to Captain Uterhart.

C. The letter of the Polish National Defense Committee addressed to Mr. Dmowski.

Messrs. Paderewski and Dmowski are avoiding by every means any meeting with the leaders of the Polish National Defense Committee and are preventing any understanding at all, spreading at the same time the information that it was the Polish National Defense Committee that prevented any coming to a mutual understanding. Isn't this some food for thought?

I am reiterating for this reason our opinion as expressed before, that the American Government should ask both parties to meet in a common conference. Not that we want the American Government to act the part of some sort of a peace-maker between quarreling Poles -- by no means. We are demanding this as a war necessity, because only by a simultaneous hearing on the matter as to what each of the parties is able to contribute to the common cause, of what connections it was disposing in Poland and in what way the thirty millions of Poles could be brought in as one of the factors in the dynamics of the war, could be drafted the plan for the future tactical and strategical action on the Eastern front and could be prepared a concentric attack against the Germans.

We are not demanding anything beyond what the Americans and the Allies have done with regard to Czajkowski's regime in Archangelsk and with regard to the coup d'etat as attempted by Tchaplín. We demand only what we are authorized to demand by President Wilson himself in his last address, when we ask "to clear the world for common understanding", and we are "the plain workaday people, which is still demanding" of the leaders of the Paris Committee as to what their authority was, what their objects were and why they avoided any discussion with us just as the owl is fleeing sunlight, and they they refuse to have any direct contact with Poland, and to subsequently use this contact for the interest of America and of the Allies and in behalf of the victory of Democracy.

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But Mr. Paderewski's party did not agree with our point of view. They considered our program dangerous to the interests of their group. Mr. John Smulski, of Chicago, in his speech at the Detroit Convention, condemned our endeavors in the following words:

"The foremost men of this group schemed among themselves a conspiracy against our entire patriotic work in order to secure, through trickery and calumnistery presentation and with the help of Americans, whom they succeeded in misleading, a condemnation of our line of activity on the part of the President of the United States and the establishing in connection with the Department of State of a Polish bureau, composed mostly of the leaders of the organization that is hostile to us. The entire proposition was very cleverly schemed but one of the prominent Americans, whom they wanted to gain for their purposes, hesitated in the last moment, obtained some more detailed information about these peoples and having secured it, refused to support them. One of the more prominent Senators expressed himself with regard to the continued calumnies made by these men against their own fellow-countrymen, that: 'he had never encountered in his life before a similar rottenness.'"

(Dziennik Zwiazkowy-Zgoda, Thursday, August 29, 1918)

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Question 8: State the program of the K.O.N. at present and your reasons for believing this program is more beneficial in the interest of the Allied cause than the program of the other Polish organizations to which you are opposed.

Answer: Through our first memorial to the President, written and sent on July 4th, 1915, at our convention in Buffalo we were the first to put the Polish question upon the order of the day in the then neutral countries, and we were first to call attention to the enormous and decisive part, that the United States were to play in the present war. We became the post of Poland's interests in America and we pointed to the strict connection of interests of both nations.

Here are some excerpts from that memorial:

"We all, as American citizens, gathered from all states of the Union, most solemnly declare our readiness to sacrifice our lives in case an armed force attacks America, OR ATTEMPTS TO ASSAIL IN ANY WAY THE ORGANIC LAWS AND RIGHTS

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OF THE NATION. At the same time we hereby testify to our appreciation and approval of the words in which you, Mr. President, have described the character and the guiding principles of the United States..... Together with you we agree that the oath of allegiance of an American citizen is an oath of ALLEGIANCE TO A GREAT IDEAL, TO A BODY OF PRINCIPLES, TO A GREAT HOPE OF THE HUMAN RACE. The American people always did do now and always will strive to secure to other nations those benefactions of peace which they themselves enjoy so much. They will not shut themselves in egoistical seclusion".

Remember that we were writing this at a time, when nobody in America was yet foreseeing the entrance of America into the war. President Wilson was the only man who understood the weight of coming events and was preparing American minds to play that great non-egoistic part, which America plays presently with such dignity on the front in France.

Further we wrote:

"Consequently in the first place we should persevere that THOSE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH AMERICA OWES ITS HAPPINESS AND ITS PEACE SHOULD BE THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LIFE AS WELL THAT THE GUARANTEE OF A PERMANENT PEACE THE FREEDOM AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF ALL THE NATIONS, THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLES, FOR THE PEOPLES AND BY THE PEOPLES SHOULD BE INVIOABLY SECURED IN THE PEACE TREATIES. Neither Russia, Prussia nor Austria will advocate the rights of Poland at the peace congress. Only the great American Republic, which itself was born from the struggle with despotism and force, can raise this important question."

Mark that we were writing this at the time when the camp of Mr. Paderewski with its irresponsible artist at its head was in ecstasy on account of the "DIVINE FEELING OF PITY OF RUSSIANS TOWARDS POLES"; when Mr. Paderewski was inviting the greatest enemy of Poland, the true servant of THE TSAR, IZWOLSKI, TO BE CHAIRMAN OF POLISH COMMITTEE IN PARIS; when the publications of that camp were reeking with EULOGIES FOR THE TSAR AND NICHOLAS NICOLAYEWITCH; when everybody in the world was looking upon her government as inefficient and egoistic. We were first to understand that the contrary is the truth. We foresaw the defeat of Russia, the decline of monarchism through the world, AND THE WORLD-LEADERSHIP OF AMERICA.

Our position has been defined by a certain French partisan of Russia of the tsar, Mr. Henry Grappin, as "DELIRIOUS AMERICANISM" (Americanisme delirant) in his pamphlet against K.O.N. published in the tsarophile Revue of Paris, edited by a Warsaw Jew Finckelhaus, known in Paris as Jean Finot. (15 December, 1917, volume CXX, pages 514-537). This gentleman attributes quite a satanic power to the Polish Committee of National Defense. BUT HE CONCEDES AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE LEADERS OF K.O.N. UNDERSTAND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AMERICAN PEOPLE; IT IS HIS PO-

LITE WAY TO EXPRESS HIS DISPLEASURE WITH AMERICAN IDEALS.

We state here once more, that we drew the plan of policy of K.O.N. for the coming years of the war already in the middle of 1915.

We cannot hew our way to Poland. We cannot fight for Poland in Poland. But on the other side we not only can, but it is as well our DUTY TO FIGHT IN THE RANKS OF THE NATION OF WHICH WE ARE A COMPONENT PART, AND WHICH IS FIGHTING FOR THE SAME ORGANIZATION OF THE WORLD, AS WE DO, AND WHICH GIVES TO POLAND AN INDEPENDENT AND DOMINANT PLACE IN IT.

WE MUST CONTRIBUTE WITH ALL OUR POWERS TO THE INCREASE OF AMERICA'S STRENGTH, TO HER WORLD'S LEADERSHIP, TO HER MILITARY VICTORY OVER GERMANY AND OVER ALL THAT COULD EVER BE IN THE WAY OF VICTORY OF THE IDEA OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

THIS WAR CANNOT BE ENDED WITH A COMPROMISE. EVERY COMPROMISE NEEDS PAYING MEDIUMS. THIS MEDIUM WOULD BE POLAND, RUSSIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES SELECTED ALREADY FOR DISMEMBERMENT.

The aim of the Polish Committee of National Defense is clear.

OUR MOTTO IS: THROUGH AMERICA FOR POLAND AND HUMANITY. THIS MOTTO HAS BEEN VOICED ON AMERICAN SOIL BY THE FIRST POLISH POLITICAL REFUGEE, PULASKI:

"WHEREVER PEOPLE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM, THEY FIGHT FOR POLAND."

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Question 9: What has the K.O.N. and its members been doing to support the Allied war program?

Answer: The Polish National defense Committee had still prior to the present war the same program as the Allies have at present, to wit: victory of Democracy and government of the people by the people and for the people. During all the time of our activity we were educating the masses of the Polish people along these lines through publications, books and lectures. We conducted a propaganda in behalf of an absolute surrendering of all of our resources to America for the purpose of helping in the materialization of the Wilson Doctrine of the world-leadership of America. If anybody would undertake the trouble of verifying this

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statement of ours, he would find that the very names of these two mottoes, to wit: the "Wilson Doctrine" and "world-leadership of America" first saw daylight on the pages of "Wici", the official publication and mouthpiece of the Polish National Defense Committee. We co-operated whole-heartedly in the state registrations for war purposes. We have in our possession a letter of thanks and appreciation of our services from the Mayor of New York City, the late John Purroy Mitchel, and from others. THIS OUR ACTIVITY WAS DISCONTINUED AS A RESULT OF DENUNCIATIONS MADE AGAINST US BY MR. PADEREWSKI'S PARTY, AS MR. PADEREWSKI WAS AT ALL TIMES ANTAGONISTIC TO THESE OUR MOTTOS MENTIONED ABOVE.

With danger to our own personal interests, to our good reputation and even to our personal liberty, we endeavored and will continue to do so, to convince the American authorities of the necessity of:

1. Organizing a special department for matters Polish in connection with the United States Government, a department which would call upon experts from both parties, who would supply to the said State Department information on Polish matters which are not party or faction matters;

2. Dispatching of an American Mission, as we demanded in our memorial of August 8, 1917, which we submitted to the Department of State, which Mission would have to establish relations with the Poles in Poland.

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Question 10. Are you and your associates willing to publish in your official organs and urge the publication in other papers in which your organization has influence, counter propaganda to be furnished them by the Committee on Public Information, properly translated from the English into the Polish language?

Answer: The answer to this question is of course in the affirmative, since the Polish National Defense Committee always endeavored and will continue to do so, to co-operate along these lines.

The Polish National Defense Committee is ready to co-operate with the United States Government in the following instances, where we deem our help to offer possibilities of being of material advantage:

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(A) Activities:

- (1) Liberty Loan Campaign;
- (2) Red Cross Drive;
- (3) War Savings Stamps;
- (4) Organization to aid American soldiers of Polish descent "Over There" and their families in America;
- (5) In case of a Slavic Exposition in Siberia in which the Polish Army will cooperate, we wish to help through propaganda and encouragement of recruiting to raise a maximum force so as to reconstruct a formidable eastern front against the Teutonic Power;
- (6) To act as interpreter in settling disputes which arise between Government officers and the Polish people in all phases of present military situation, owing to lack of knowledge on either side of the other tongue;

(B) Educational Work:


- (1) We wish to cooperate with the Department of Interior to teach the Poles the English language;
- (2) Spread propaganda in order to increase public school attendance;
- (3) To establish social centers for the Polish people such as libraries, public parks, gymnasiums, etc.
- (4) To give lectures on American history, American constitution, rights and duties of citizenship, evolution of democratic ideas, "Wilson Doctrine", moral and mental uplift of mankind, in Polish, for adult immigrants.

The activities set forth under (A) and (B) to be carried on effectively must be formulated according to a responsible plan, and it is very important that universal harmony with the respective departments of the Government and the central Polish National Defense Committee exist.

4 maja 1918

Na oryginalne poświadczenie

B. Kleszczewski



Memorij mediorij Kniaz' par. House'a
mee Antovijev Faraway (recte Zekel-
wicz - Fubruawa)

POLAND'S TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

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1667/95

XII

In presenting and defending our territorial claims we must bear in mind three main points, viz: (a) what we might claim; (b) what we should claim, and (c) what we must claim.

(a) As to what we might claim or the historical points as a basis, we must go back to the first partition of Poland in 1772. Assuming the territory of the Polish Commonwealth as it existed before the first partition as a point of departure we would by pressing our claim to all of Poland's possessions come in conflict with the principle of nationality, the only just existence and the very one on which we base our own claim to unity, liberty and independence.

Poland, prior to the first partition, held territories which, while politically part and parcel of the Polish State, were foreign to Poland geographically as well as ethnographically. Acquired by conquest or covenant, they belonged to the body politic of Poland until detached with other parts in the times of the partitions. We have in mind in this connection the eastermost as well as the north-eastern possessions of Poland, for instance, the provinces (palatinates-in old Polish administrative parlance) of Vitebsk, Polotsk, Mscislw and Mohylev.

The Polish element in these districts represented by owners of large estates who were high dignitaries of the State or of the Church, and by the gentry was too small when compared with the bulk of the indigenous peasant population to put an indelible stamp of Polonism on these lands. Hence, our claim to them, while historically valid, could not be vindicated nowadays

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in view of the evolution of the idea and theory of nationalism. If, at the time of Poland's first partition, only those territories had been detached from the body politic of the Commonwealth, which the latter for the above reasons could have afforded to lose without serious damage to its prestige as a state and its vitality as a political organism, such a surgical operation might, while painful, have strengthened, so to say, the real body of Poland. Unfortunately, the partitioning powers grabbed besides some essential parts of Poland, and thus initiated a procedure of mutilation which could not but terminate eventually in death of Poland's political organism.

As to Gdansk (Dantzic) West Prussia and the Polish littoral on the Baltic, conditions are somehow different. There a reversed situation obtained, the bulk of the population was Polish by nationality, while the moneyed class of landholders, and in Gdansk the merchants and shipowners, were of German nationality. The traditions of the Hansa, of which Gdansk was a member, were at all times alive in that city and the loyalty of that city to the Polish state was not to small an extent caused by relatively better conditions afforded to its business life in a weak and easy-going Poland than in strong and centralistic Prussia. In East and West Prussia never anything else but a fief of the Polish Crown, as well as in Courland and Polish Livonia, which lands from the Polish Baltic littoral, the German element, represented by the nobility and landowners recruited from among former members of the secularized Order of the German Knights, and of the Order of the Knights of the Sword (in Livonia) was strong enough to impress a distinct German stamp on those territories, notwithstanding the fact that the peasant population (Letts, Kaszube, Mazurians, etc) were not German.

As to Silesia, that once Polish land became detached from the main body of Poland at the close of the XIV and the beginning of the XV century, through our shortsightedness. Bordering close on Germany, Silesia underwent the process of Germanization much more thoroughly than any other province held by Prussia. Only the poor class of people, economically dependent and weak, resisted complete denationalization through a passive resistance which is characteristic of oppressed peoples, who, while economically exploited by their foreign masters, humiliated and held in contempt by the ruling class, and persecuted, cling to the nationality or religion as the case may be, of their forebears as a sign of silent and grim protest against oppression.

Being too far away from her mother-land, Silesia could hardly come into consideration for being reclaimed by us for Poland. Although under the influence of a socialistic propaganda there was in the last few decades an awakening of the Polish national spirit, the prevailing economic conditions seem to preclude any possibility of that province being regained by us. Germany's hold on that land is so strong and so manifold that the Polish element, not sufficiently strong from the economic point of view, cannot very well redeem that land for Poland.

Such were the conditions when the partitions of Poland, consummated in 1772, 1793 and 1795/6 respectively, detached these territories from Poland the latter being also disrupted by her neighbors who first laid their hands on those border lands.

Conditions have since become worse rather than better. In White and Black Ruthenia or Russia, Volhynia and Podolia, the Polish element represented by the gentry and aristocracy was not able to prevent the steady, although slow pushing-out process put

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into operation by Russia, and exercised under high pressure without shrinking from violence, forcible proselytism in behalf of the Greek-Orthodox Church colonization by Russian peasants. This steady and unrelenting pressure had its way in the course of little over a century, and reduced the Polish element and its importance as well as its absolute and relative strength to a considerable extent.

In the northern provinces of the former Poland (Gdansk, Dantzig, East and West Prussia) the conditions were even worse. The unprecedented development of Germany along lines of economic and commercial success, the influx of business and wealth into Gdansk from Germany and through Germans could not but strengthen the aboriginal German element in that city, relegating the economically dependent and weak Polish element (small shopkeepers, artisans, farmers and laborers) into the background. The nationalistic struggle there became merged with class struggle, and the latter became to all intents and purposes, a synonym for the former. There, too, the oppressed Poles, Mazurians, Kaszubs, became members of the opposition parties in the social life of Prussia and Germany as well, and fought for the national issues from the parliamentary platform and under the slogan of social reforms.

(b) What we should claim. We will answer this question in a negative way. We should not claim anything in case we should get possession of could bring us in conflict with the interests of our neighbors, of ourselves, with the principle of nationalism on which we ourselves base our imprescriptible claim to unity and independence. In short, we should not acquire any foreign element into our body politic and while some of the ter-

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territories we would have to forego under these circumstances constitute a painful loss to us, either from the historic point of view or for reasons of economic nature, we would ultimately benefit by such a course. We should, under no circumstances, absorb to any extent any foreign national element into our body politic unless that foreign element does join our state of its free volition, fully conscious of the obligations flowing from such a step, and willing to be an integral part and parcel of our social and political organism. We cannot afford to incorporate foreign elements, the sympathies of which might make them lean towards their neighbours across the border line. Such a course would mean to us a double danger: first, the centrifugal tendencies of those foreign elements, and second, the danger of foreign intervention.

As to the centrifugal tendencies so subversive to both the political and social, as well as economic life of a state, we have ample examples in our times to mention only Alsace-Lorraine, the Danes in Germany, the Trentino in Austria the Roumanians and Serbians in Hungary, etc. All these ailments of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter in particular, are hereditary and require a surgical operation, which in case of the Hapsburg empire-kingdom is exceedingly painful and dangerous. We, however, are in a different position: we are starting our independent life anew, and can set our house in order in such a way that troubles of the above nature can easily be eliminated a priori.

We are confronted by the task of rebuilding what has been destroyed in the hundred years of our triple bondage, and must concentrate our entire strength for that work, instead of splitting it up into endeavors along lines of national proselytism and assimilation, which are contrary to our best traditions and the results of

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which are dubious at best.

Furthermore, we must avoid at all cost the danger of foreign intervention, which is really incurred when a foreign element dwells within the body politic of a nation. We had experiences along that line in the case of the "dissidents" a religious and national issue at the same time, which eventually brought about the Confederacy of Bar, 1767, and led to the first partition of Poland. We must avoid that our neighbours should establish or endeavor to establish so-called spheres of influence or proceed with a propaganda of peaceful penetration in behalf of their nationals within our borders. Germany had always followed the policy of protecting Germans living in foreign countries, even if they be citizens of the latter (Deutscher, Deutscher Grenzmarkenverein, , Verein zur Foerderung des Deutschthums im Auslande, etc). Thus a way was open to Germany to mingle in the internal affairs of neighbouring and far outlying countries through social and educational and even religious channels (Lutherverein, Gustav Adolph Verein, all engaged in Protestant and German national propaganda). We cannot permit of becoming the sphere of influence political, national or economic of any nation if we want to preserve our dearly regained independence.

Our national energy cannot be wasted for assimilating foreign elements aside from the fact that the principal of nationalism forbids us to impose or impress on any race an allegiance or nationality foreign to theirs and against their volition.

Having thus stated in broad lines what our nation should claim by showing what we should not claim, it behooves us to state what we must claim.

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(c) We must claim, in the interest of our national and political vitality all of geographical and ethnographical Poland.

By this we mean the Polish lands inhabited since times immemorial by the Polish race and in which the latter preserves an overwhelming or substantial majority or is represented by a percentage which is potentially strong enough to develop in spite of the foreign element settled in the same regions.

In our claims we include

1. All the strictly Polish provinces held by Prussia (Posnania) regardless of the artificial German element colonized there under the expropriation or colonization laws.

2. All of Galicja without such portions of East Galicja where the Ruthenian population being in overwhelming majority would rightfully belong to or gravitate towards the Ukrainian State now in the process of formation. Lwow (Lemberg), however, must be claimed as a Polish city all objections notwithstanding.

Furthermore,

3. All which was formerly known as Russian Poland, including the so-called "readjusted" province of Chelm.

4. The question of Poland having access to the sea is a problem paramount to our economic life and development of the country.

It is most doubtful whether Germany will, unless utterly beaten, agree to yield Gdansk (Dantzic) and its territory to Poland, and whether, should this be the case, it would be of benefit to us to acquire those lands in view of what we have said above. Access to the sea could be obtained by us in case of a union with Lithuania as will be shown in that connection.

There is, however, another possibility of solving the problem of Gdansk, viz.,

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the neutralization of that city and that portion of the Vistula which will flow through German territory. Whether an effective neutralization of that kind is feasible exceeds the scope of our lines; we may, however, add that an arrangement like this would have to be entrenched behind some substantial guarantees in order not to be reduced, should some contingency arise, to a mere "Scrap of Paper".

In case of Gdansk remaining in the hands of Prussia, there is another possibility for Poland having the much coveted access to the sea through Nemel in Lithuania, now in Prussian hands. This solution, however, presupposes a union with Lithuania, which the Poles and Lithuanians equally desire and which is the only logical and just arrangement between two nations which for four centuries lived in a close political union dissolved only by force brought to bear from outside.

UNION WITH LITHUANIA.

The historical basis for a union between Poland and Lithuania is given in the Covenant of Lublin of 1569; this Covenant needs but few amplifications along modern lines in order to do justice both to the nations entering into such an agreement as well as to the principle that every nation, race or people should be free and unhampered to determine its own destiny.

The advantage of the union will be mutual. For Poland it will mean additional strength, correct boundaries and access to the sea; a market for our industry as Lithuania is less industrialized than Poland. For Lithuania, the union with Poland will mean perfect safety for national life and development, strengthening of its status as a political unit a ready and always open market for her agricultural

products. The two states linked together by a union between equals will while preserving their respective individuality in their territories present to the outside world a single political organism strong enough to command respect of its neighbours and economically self-sufficient enough to exist.

This union must include all of geographical and ethnographical Lithuania with such deductions of territory which are dictated by considerations of the principle of nationality, of expediency (from the point of view of strategical frontiers, elimination of foreign and possibly antagonistic elements, etc., etc.) In determining the territory of Lithuania we must just as in the case of Poland proceed along lines of racial and religious distribution. Religion is among peoples and races the intellectual development of which remains still below the commonly adopted standard prevailing elsewhere, the pivot around which the life of the people or race turns and the conception of the church replaces the conception of nationality. This refers in particular to such peoples within geographical Lithuania who are not members of the Roman Catholic or Greek Uniate Church, but profess the Greek Orthodox creed. They will of course gravitate towards their coreligionists across the vorder line, and no amount of religious tolerance will possibly bridge that gap.

Lithuania which is Catholic throughout and the White Russians who reside within geographical Lithuania and are either Roman Catholics or belong to the Greek Uniate Church will present no problem from the point of view of religion.

Politically the Lithuanians, while eagerly anxious to preserve their national individuality are now distinctly pro-Polish.

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Russian influence has in the times preceding the war endeavored to sow discord and create an artificial nationalistic Lithuanian movement with a distinct anti-Polish tendency. This movement was short-lived and took no hold on the large mass of the Lithuanian people which learned its lesson at the hands of the Russians and lately at those of the Germans.

The Lithuanians know well what would become of them if they were incorporated into the German Empire under whatever form it be; the Polish element (18%) although the wealthiest and most intellectual, would be the first to bear the brunt of the Prussian exterminating policy, while the Lithuanians and White Russians, because economically less resistant, would very soon fall into a condition of practically forced labor in behalf of their German exploiters who would not shrink from any expedient in order to "penetrate" Lithuania politically as well as economically.

FRONTIERS.

Natural frontiers exist only in the South where the Carpathians, running from west to southwest, form a natural boundary line from Hungary. In the North the coast line of the Baltic can form a natural boundary provided Gdansk and its "hinterland" reverts to Poland. In case, however, it should remain in the hands of Prussia, only the Lithuanian coast-line of the Baltic could serve as a natural northern frontier, otherwise, from the estuary of the Warta into the Oder an artificial boundary line will have to be drawn as far as the river system of the Niemen; this line would have to be drawn with consideration for ethnographical moments, for the principle of nationality, majority or minority theory.

Since rivers no longer represent a feasible border line we

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have to fall back on the so-called river systems, that is, the valleys of rivers and their tributaries, which present a more logical basis for racial or political delimitation: Thus we would have in the West as a frontier line against Germany, the river system of the Warta, which is a right bank tributary of the Oder. In the East we would have the river systems of the Dvina, the Dnieper (its right bank tributaries) and in the Southeast the river system of the Dan- iester in its upper course. The frontier line in the East could in certain places follow the present battle line on the eastern war theatre: this line while not having the attributes of a natural or strategical frontier follows in general the line of demarcation between the territories of the former Commonwealth of Poland in which the Polish element, the Polish spirit and Polish civilization appeared indelible and where the peasant (indigenous) population themselves, are Roman Catholics or Uniates and such territories where the Polish spirit, element and civilization were not so irresistible and the Great Orthodox Church was and is the dominant religious body.

Minorities below a certain percentage to be agreed upon will have to be sacrificed unless a reapportionment and exchange of territories on the basis of international treaties and mutual agreement of the parties concerned could be reached.

A just and logical ethnographical frontier would in the absence of a strategical or natural frontier serve the purpose by eliminating as much as humanly possible all elements of racial or religious friction which could be productive of conflicts.

Recapitulating our ideas as to the drawing of frontier lines for Poland and Lithuania we state that we want frontiers which will not divide us from but unite us with our neighbours. If the frontier lines are logical and just they will have the latter affect, if

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nd, conflicts are unavoidable until the conditions are remedied.

Logically drawn frontiers of Poland would give us the entire river system of the Vistula (except its estuary in case Gdansk remained in the hands of Prussia); furthermore, parts of the river system of the Oder (Warta) of the Dvina, the Dnieper and the Dniester laying within Polish territory, United by canals (which undoubtedly will come into prominence after the war) with the Oder, the Danube, the Black Sea and the Baltic, these river systems would constitute convenient waterways for our commercial expansion.

За згоду і з оглядом

Г. М. Ставровський

